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Article 2

Not Sick Yet
FOOD-SAFETY-IMPACT LITIGATION AND BARRIERS
TO JUSTICIABILITY
Diana R. H. Winters†
INTRODUCTION
The United States food-safety regulatory program is a
behemoth. It is overseen by at least five federal agencies
administering at least six statutes. Yet almost 17 percent of the
American population (approximately forty-eight million people)
gets sick from food each year, 128,000 of these people are
hospitalized, and three thousand die.1 Foodborne illness costs
the United States over $150 billion per year.2 Food recalls are
massive and frequent—like that of cantaloupe in 2011, which,
with approximately thirty deaths from listeria, was the
deadliest outbreak in almost a century;3 eggs in 2010, where
†

Visiting Assistant Professor, Boston University School of Law. Associate
Professor, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law, as of August 2012.
J.D., New York University School of Law; Ph.D., Harvard University. I am grateful for
the comments of Jack M. Beermann, Jay D. Wexler, Abigail R. Moncrieff, Stacey
Dogan, William E. Nelson, Cecelia Chang, and Ben H. Winters, for the research
assistance of Crystal Axelrod and Margalit Faden, and for the excellent comments of
the staff of the Brooklyn Law Review.
1
CDC Estimates of Foodborne Illness in the United States, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/foodborneburden/2011foodborne-estimates.html (last updated Feb. 7, 2012). This CDC estimate was made
public in December 2010. Id. The previous estimate was higher—seventy-six million
people a year getting sick, with five thousand dying. See William Neuman, New
Estimates of Food Poisoning Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/business/16illness.html?scp=1&sq=cdc%20food%20
poisoning&st=cse. The lowering of the numbers is a result of different calculation
methods, not an improvement in food safety. Id.
2
ROBERT L. SCHARFF, HEALTH-RELATED COSTS FROM FOODBORNE ILLNESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (Produce Safety Project, Georgetown Univ. 2010), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Produce_Safety_Proje
ct/PSP-Scharff%20v9.pdf?n=1136. This study was based on the Center for Disease
Control’s (CDC) previous estimates of seventy-six million sick Americans a year, and
therefore would be lower based on the new estimates. Id. The costs include medical
services, deaths, and lost work and disability. Id. at 2.
3
Michael Booth, Cantaloupe Listeria Outbreak Declared Over as One Last
Death Reported, DENVER POST (Dec. 9, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/
news/ci_19502146.
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more than a thousand people were sickened with
salmonellosis;4 peanut butter in 2009, with over four hundred
hospitalizations, and at least six deaths;5 and spinach in 2006,
where 131 people were sickened and over sixty hospitalized.6
The nation’s food regulatory system is inefficient,
underenforced, and underfunded.
Although multiple agencies are responsible for food safety,
and have overlapping duties, there are wide gaps in oversight and
regulation.7 The agencies must negotiate the competing goals of
protecting the public health, marketing the nation’s commodities,
and appeasing the interests of regulated entities. Compounding
this problem is a severe shortage of resources allocated to foodsafety enforcement.8 Given the regulatory failures,9 and their
4

Scott Hensley, Salmonella Cases Rise as Recall of Contaminated Eggs
Grows, NPR (Aug. 20, 2010, 12:29 p.m.), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/
08/20/129321965/salmonella-recalled-egg-contamination. Salmonellosis is an infection
caused by the bacteria salmonella.
5
More Peanut Butter Products Recalled, MSNBC (Jan. 18, 2009, 6:52 PM),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28695782/ns/health-food_safety/.
6
Drew Falkenstein, Spinach Recall Among Huffington Post’s Worst Product
Recalls of All Time, FOOD POISON J. (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.foodpoisonjournal.com/
2010/02/articles/foodborne-illness-outbreaks/spinach-recall-among-huffington-posts-worstproduct-recalls-of-all-time/.
7
Broadly conceived, food safety covers three areas: (1) the prevention of
foodborne illness; (2) nutrition monitoring; and (3) the prevention of fraud in the
marketplace. This article only addresses the first category, although there is overlap
amongst the three. For example, I do not discuss cases regarding deceptive claims or
fraudulent labeling, such as those brought in recent years by the Center for Science in
the Public Interest (CSPI), although they certainly concern food safety. See, e.g.,
Amended Complaint at 1-2, 29, Parham v. McDonald’s Corp., No. CGC-10-506178 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011), available at http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/mcdonald_
scomplaint.pdf (CSPI’s McDonald’s litigation charges McDonald’s with unfair and
deceptive marketing for including toys in Happy Meals); Complaint at 2-3, Ackerman
v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 09-CV-0395 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2009), available at
http://cspinet.org/new/pdf/vitaminwater_filed_complaint.pdf (CSPI’s VitaminWater
litigation charges Coca-Cola with fraudulent marketing for including claims of
healthfulness on its VitaminWater products).
8
See, e.g., William Neuman, On Food Safety, a Long List but Little Money, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/business/with-a-long-list-and-shorton-money-fda-tackles-food-safety.html?scp=5&sq=%22food%20safety%22%20fund&st=cse.
9
The Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA), signed by the President on
January 4, 2011, addresses some of the problems with the regulatory system. It provides
more power, and, theoretically, more funding to the Food and Drug Administration for its
food-safety duties, and changes the food-safety focus of the agency from responsive to
preventative. See Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885
(2011). It does not, however, address the inefficiencies or inconsistencies caused by the
fact that multiple agencies have authority over food regulation, nor does it alter the fact
that the agencies have political imperatives, see, e.g., James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference
in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of
Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 962-72 (2008), and, in some instances, must balance
the competing goals of economic viability of food production with the public health. See,
e.g., Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/
usdahome?navid=MISSION_STATEMENT (last modified Oct. 29, 2009).
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significant public health consequences, it is imperative to discuss
alternatives to regulation as a means to improve the food-safety
system in this country.
Advocacy group litigation can complement agency
regulation in the field of food safety. And, just as such litigation
enhances the enforcement of environmental laws, so too can
advocacy group litigation add an element of “attentive
monitoring” to food-safety statutes.10 This paper provides, for
the first time, a comprehensive examination of advocacy group
litigation, or food-safety-impact litigation,11 in the food-safety
context, assessing its viability and utility.
In evaluating the potential efficacy of food-safety-impact
litigation, this paper puts particular focus on the barriers to
justiciability that such litigation faces,12 including standing
challenges and justiciability issues under the Administrative
Procedure Act.13 These threshold issues are particularly
important here because plaintiffs in advocacy group litigation are
not the direct objects of the regulation they target14 and because
the injury to which they point is often an increased risk of future
harm.15 Although the environmental laws contain structural legal
elements, such as citizen-suit provisions and consultative
arrangements, which food-safety laws do not, the absence of such
10

William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S.
Environmental Law: Origins and Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1019-21
(1994). Rodgers explains that “attentive monitoring,” which contributes to the success
of certain seminal environmental laws, comprises “personal activities such as face-toface observation, emotions such as shame and pride, and group sanctions such as
ostracism and citizen lawsuits.” Id. at 1020. He notes that these mechanisms are
encouraged by structural legal changes. Id.
11
This article defines food-safety-impact litigation as suits brought against
food-safety regulatory agencies to improve the regulatory scheme for the purpose of
protecting the public health in general and the plaintiff’s own health in particular.
Impact litigation may be brought, for example, to contest an allegedly arbitrary and
capricious denial of an administrative petition, or to argue that a final agency action
was unreasonable.
12
I confine my discussion here to cases brought by individuals or entities against
regulatory agencies for the purpose of forcing the agency to comply with its statutory
mandate by either passing regulation, or interpreting existing regulations differently.
13
Food-safety litigants suing private parties under state law or suing state
government to enforce or strengthen state regulation must also negotiate federal
preemption doctrine. Preemption issues, however, do not arise in litigation against the
federal government, for obvious reasons, and I therefore leave a discussion of
preemption issues to another paper.
14
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
15
Impact litigation in the field of food safety is brought before an outbreak of
foodborne illness, and seeks stronger regulation to prevent or minimize the chance of
such an outbreak. For that reason, such litigation must be based on probabilities—the
plaintiffs argue that it is x percent more likely that an outbreak of foodborne illness
will take place with the current state of regulation than with the requested regulation.
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provisions is not an insurmountable barrier to impact litigation.16
Thus despite these justiciability challenges, food-safety-impact
suits are possible to bring, and possible to win.
Why, then, is there so little food-safety-impact
litigation? Essentially, the answer is that there is no culture of
citizen food-safety litigation, as there is for environmentalimpact litigation. The environmental bar has spent decades
learning to litigate around the justiciability barriers discussed
in this paper, and courts have adapted many of these doctrines
for the environmental context.17 But there is no food protection
community practiced in the art of litigation against agency
action and inaction.
For food-safety-impact litigation to be successful it must
be modeled after environmental litigation. The doctrines
developed by environmental-impact litigation provide an
avenue for successful pre-illness food-safety litigation. Both
food-safety and environmental-impact litigation depend on
probabilities and involve great uncertainty. Governmental
regulation of this uncertainty involves a negotiation of risk,
cost-benefit analysis, public perception, and political reality.
Both the environmental laws and the food-safety laws envision
a joint state-federal system of enforcement. Moreover, the
injury stemming from environmental or food-safety harms is
likely to be widely shared, yet particularized. For this reason,
the few courts that have actually dealt with food-safety-impact
litigation look to environmental litigation as a backdrop,18 and
mechanisms developed by litigants to maneuver environmental
16

I have spoken with several lawyers at public interest organizations who
confirmed my inclination that food-safety cases can be successful. For example, Allison
Zieve, the director of Public Citizen’s Litigation Group, told me that these cases were no
longer generated by anyone at her organization, and that she would be willing to consider
such suits if litigable issues were brought to her attention. Telephone Interview with
Allison Zieve, Dir., Pub. Citizen Litig. Grp. (Jan. 28, 2011) (notes on file with the author).
I spoke with a former Associate Chief Counsel of the FDA, who asked not to be named,
who told me that during his tenure at the FDA, which was during George W. Bush’s
administration, several of his colleagues and he wished there had been citizen litigation
against the FDA. During these years, he explained, the agency was market oriented
instead of food-safety oriented, and he felt that citizen litigation could have forced the
agency’s hand as to certain regulatory issues in the food-safety field.
Indeed the food-safety-impact litigation that does exist has a more than
respectable success rate—out of thirteen cases, plaintiffs achieved at least some of
their requested relief in three of the cases, and a fourth case was mooted when the
agency adopted plaintiff’s position during pendency of the suit.
17
See Va. State Corp. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 468 F.3d
845, 847-49 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
18
See, e.g., Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003); Levine v.
Johanns, No. C 05-04764 MHP, No. C 05-05346 MHP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at
*14-31 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2006).
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litigation past justiciability barriers are both necessary and
useful for food-safety litigation.
This article begins a discussion of the parameters and
implications of food-safety citizen and advocacy group
litigation. Moreover, this article provides an added perspective
on the need for courts to adapt traditional barriers to
justiciability to the realities of litigation that involves injuries
based on the possibility of future harm and the increase in risk
associated thereof. Food safety involves issues on the frontier of
regulation, including the need to address the role of lifestyle
choice in conjunction with public health, and the need to
regulate a massive system involving minutely local as well as
global elements. Moreover, issues about food are increasingly
in the forefront of public awareness. The understanding that
advocacy-group litigation is possible and can be successful may
be a valuable tool for this burgeoning movement.
Any expansion of the regulatory state carries challenges
to its scope and authority as a counterpart to its growth. These
challenges come both from proponents and opponents of
regulation.19 As noted above, public challenges to the regulatory
system will confront obstacles to litigation, as courts attempt to
negotiate their role vis-à-vis this public litigation. Justiciability
issues will be at the forefront of much public litigation in the
coming years.
This article proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the
structure of the United States food regulatory system, and
looks at some of the problems with agency enforcement and
nonlegal sanctions. Part II discusses the absence of a culture of
food-safety-impact litigation, addressing the nature of food and
the divergent paths that environmental protection and foodsafety regulation have taken in the United States. Part III
turns to the justiciability barriers that food-safety-impact
plaintiffs will face, and have faced in the few already litigated
cases, focusing on constitutional and prudential standing
issues, and reviewability challenges under the Administrative
Procedure Act. This section concludes with an analysis of how
food-safety citizen plaintiffs can successfully navigate the
justiciability challenges they are sure to face. Finally, the
19

See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557
F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2009) (public interest group and union challenge Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation for its underregulation of
hexavalent chromium; industry group challenges the same regulation for its
overregulation of same chemical).
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article concludes that, under certain circumstances, citizen
litigation can be a valuable counterpart to government
regulation and spur regulatory agencies to fulfill their
statutory mandates. Food-safety regulation, like environmental
regulation, is a massive endeavor involving many agencies,
statutes, regulated entities, and beneficiaries, and requiring
vast resources. As citizen advocacy groups have acted as a
counterpart to government regulation in the environmental
arena, so could they be useful in the field of food safety.
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES FOOD
REGULATORY SYSTEM

A.

The Regulatory Structure of Food Safety

Food safety is mainly overseen by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA), although several other agencies play a part as well.20
Government regulation of food has historically had three main
purposes: (1) to protect the integrity of the market; (2) to
regulate the nutritional content of food; and (3) to protect the
safety of the food supply.21 Although there is overlap among the
three goals, the topic of this paper—impact litigation to
minimize the threat of foodborne illness—is mostly contained
within the third.22
The FDA has authority under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) over most food products except meat,
poultry, and processed egg products.23 The FFDCA, passed in
20

The Environmental Protection Agency regulates drinking water and
pesticide residues; the Federal Trade Commission shares jurisdiction over advertising;
the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau regulates alcohol; the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention tracks foodborne illness; the National Marine
Fisheries Service helps regulate fish and seafood products; the Customs Service
regulates imported foods; and the Department of Justice prosecutes individuals and
companies for violations of food-safety statutes. See NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD
REGULATION 24-27 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2009).
21
Peter Barton Hutt, Government Regulation of the Integrity of the Food
Supply, 4 ANN. REV. NUTRITION 1, 2 (1984).
22
Protecting the food supply includes more than the prevention of foodborne
illness. It can also involve measures to prevent external security threats, for example,
intentional poisoning of the food supply, which I do not discuss in this article. See, e.g., Armen
Keteyian, Latest Terror Threat in U.S. Aimed to Poison Food, CBS NEWS (Dec. 20, 2010,
11:48 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/12/20/eveningnews/main7169266.shtml.
Additionally, steps taken to protect the food supply may also protect the integrity of the
market, and vice versa.
23
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-2252 (2006). The FDA does have authority, however, over
imported wild game. See Fact Sheets: Meat Preparation, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
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1938, updated the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act.24 It has been
substantially amended since 1938, but still retains its basic
structure.25 The 1938 FFDCA has been described as “a catalogue
of definitions elaborating two basic concepts: ‘adulteration’ and
‘misbranding.’”26 The Act specifies when a food (or drug device or
cosmetic) is adulterated or misbranded, and prohibits the
distribution or sale of any such food.27
To enforce the FFDCA, the FDA has authority to
institute various administrative, civil, or criminal actions. It
can issue warning letters, request a voluntary recall of an
adulterated product, order recalls under certain circumstances,
seize products that violate the Act,28 assess civil penalties,29 and
work with the Department of Justice to take court action.30
The FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, signed into
law in January 2011, is the biggest reform of the FDA’s food
regulatory powers since 1938, and its implementation will
reorient the FDA to take a preventative rather than a
responsive role regarding food safety.31 The Act amends the
FFDCA to, among other things, give the FDA: (a) mandatory
recall authority;32 (b) expanded authority to inspect records;33
and (c) the authority to suspend the registration of a food
facility.34 The Act also requires owners and operators of food

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Factsheets/Farm_Raised_Game/index.asp#4 (last modified
May 27, 2011).
24
Hutt, supra note 21, at 7.
25
PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD
AND DRUG LAW 14 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2007).
26
Id. at 13.
27
21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 342, 343.
28
Id. §§ 334, 350a(f)(2); FORTIN, supra note 20, at 510; see also Inspections,
Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/default.htm (last updated
Feb. 8, 2012).
29
21 U.S.C. § 335b.
30
Id. § 337.
31
Certain provisions in the Act, such as the mandatory recall provisions, take
effect immediately, while the FDA must write rules to implement other provisions of the
Act. See Helena Bottemiller, Q & A with Michael Taylor, Part I: Implementing FSMA, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/01/qa-with-michaeltayor-part-1-implementing-fsma/. Implementation of the Act’s provisions and the FDA’s
expanded powers also rests on whether adequate funding is provided by Congress, an
issue that is in question. See Lyndsey Layton, Overhaul of Food Safety Laws May Not
Be to GOP’s Taste, WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/12/24/AR2010122402795.html.
32
S. 510, 111th Cong. § 206 (2010) (amending scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
33
Id. § 101 (amending 21 U.S.C. § 350c(a)).
34
Id. § 102(b) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 350d(a)).
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facilities to evaluate the hazards that could affect food,35 and
implement and monitor preventative controls.36 Imported food
will have to meet the same standards.37 The FDA is also
directed to increase inspections of domestic and foreign
facilities, directing resources to the riskiest facilities.38
The USDA shares authority over food safety with the
FDA. Its Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) has authority
over meat, poultry, processed egg products, and egg grading,39
and it regulates products related to meat and poultry,
including stews, pizzas, and frozen foods. The major food-safety
statutes administered by the USDA are the Federal Meat
Inspection Act (FMIA), passed in 190640 and amended in 1967
by the Wholesome Meat Act;41 the Poultry Products Inspection
Act (PPIA);42 and the Egg Products Inspection Act (EPIA).43 The
FSIS, like the FDA, can issue warning letters and seize
products under the FMIA and the PPIA.44
Unlike food producers under the authority of the FDA,45
however, meat-and-poultry producing establishments must
have a USDA inspector present whenever they are operating.46
Much of the FSIS’s power over the food supply for which it is
responsible stems from its ability to take a regulatory control
action in relation to its inspection authority. Such actions
include “the retention of product, rejection of equipment or
facilities, slowing or stopping of lines, or refusal to allow the
processing of specifically-identified product.”47 FSIS can also
withhold a mark of federal inspection (without which a product
35

Facilities will have to implement Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point (HACCP) protocols, which the USDA has required of meat and poultry facilities
since 2003. See, e.g., Control of Listeria Monocytogenes in Ready-to-Eat Meat and
Poultry Products, 9 C.F.R. § 430.4 (2003).
36
S. 510, 111th Cong. § 103 (2010) (amending scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
37
Id. §§ 301-309 (amending scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
38
Id. §§ 201-211 (amending scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
39
About FSIS, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV.,
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/index.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2012).
40
FORTIN, supra note 20, at 6.
41
21 U.S.C. §§ 610-611 (2006); FORTIN, supra note 20, at 29.
42
21 U.S.C. §§ 451-472.
43
Id. §§ 1031-1056.
44
Id. §§ 673, 467b.
45
This may change, in that the FSMA directs the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish regulations concerning
inspections for facilities under its authority. S. 510, 111th Cong. § 201 (2010).
46
9 C.F.R. § 302.3 (2010); FORTIN, supra note 20, at 567 (“FSIS inspects meat
and poultry under a ‘continuous inspection’ system, which means that an inspector is
assigned to every FSIS-regulated establishment and is required to be present when the
establishment is in operation.”).
47
FORTIN, supra note 20, at 568.
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cannot be distributed or sold), or suspend inspection at a
certain facility.48 If inspections are suspended at a facility, the
facility must stop operating until the USDA reinstitutes
inspections.49 If a grant of federal inspection is withdrawn, a
facility must cease operations completely.50
B.

Enforcement Shortcomings

Notwithstanding the imposing regulatory structure
built to oversee food safety, and the recent enactment of the
FSMA, our food regulatory system is falling short for several
reasons. First, the bifurcation of major food regulatory duties
between the FDA and the USDA results in inefficiencies,
inconsistencies, and even some absurdities.51 For an oftrepeated example, pizza is regulated by the FDA unless it has
a topping of more than 2 percent of cooked meat or poultry, in
which case the USDA is in charge.52 For this reason, pizza
production facilities are often regulated by both agencies.53
Redundant oversight is clearly inefficient. But more
dangerous to the consuming public is the possibility of
inconsistency in the agencies’ regulatory regimes. For example,
eggs are subject to a baffling array of regulations and regulatory
oversight, the result of which leaves gaps in food-safety
enforcement.54 Eggs were responsible for approximately 75

48

9 C.F.R. § 500.1-2.
FORTIN, supra note 20, at 513.
50
Id. at 514.
51
Consolidation of agency responsibilities, an often touted solution, is not
only politically inviable at this time, but also may not actually fix the problems. See,
e.g., Note, Reforming the Food Safety System: What if Consolidation Isn’t Enough?, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2007) [hereinafter Reforming the Food Safety System].
52
See Investigation Operations Manual, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/ucm127390.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
53
Reforming the Food Safety System, supra note 51, at 1350 (citing INST. OF
MED. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD: FROM PRODUCTION TO
CONSUMPTION 85 (1998)).
54
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES, FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY OVERSIGHT (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d11289.pdf (“FDA is generally responsible for ensuring that eggs in their
shells—referred to as shell eggs—including eggs at farms such as those where the
outbreak occurred, are safe, wholesome, and properly labeled. FSIS, on the other hand,
is responsible for the safety of eggs processed into egg products. In addition, USDA’s
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) sets quality and grade standards for shell eggs,
such as Grade A, but does not test the eggs for bacteria such as Salmonella. Further,
while USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service manages the program that
helps ensure laying hens are free from Salmonella at birth, FDA oversees the safety of
the feed they eat.”).
49
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percent of all salmonella outbreaks between 1985 and 199855—
although this percentage may be dropping due to a new egg-safety
rule promulgated by the FDA in 200956—and the country was
reminded of their potential dangerousness during the massive
2010 egg recall. There is also the possibility of inconsistency
within one agency’s regulation of different products. For example,
in one of the suits discussed below, poultry consumers sued the
USDA over what they contended was irrationally inconsistent
treatment of meat and poultry.57
Funding for food safety is also a problem. The Center for
Science in the Public Interest has noted that “[s]ince 1972,
inspections conducted by the FDA declined 81 percent. Since
2003, the number of FDA field staff dropped by 12 percent, and
between 2003 and 2006 federal inspections dropped by 47
percent.”58 Although meat and poultry account for less
foodborne illness than do seafood and fresh produce, which are
regulated by the FDA, the USDA spends significantly more
money on food safety than does the FDA.59 Moreover, the FDA
will not be able to implement the inspections mandated by the
Food Safety Modernization Act if Congress withholds funding,
as it has threatened to do.60
Finally, there is a perception that both the FDA and the
USDA are subject to agency capture, whereby regulated
entities exert such an influence over their regulators that they
essentially control the agencies, at the expense of the intended
beneficiaries of the regulatory system.61 The prevalence of such

55

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-99-184, FOOD SAFETY: U.S.
LACKS A CONSISTENT FARM-TO-TABLE APPROACH TO EGG SAFETY 3-4 (1999), available
at http://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-99-184.
56
Prevention of Salmonella Enteritidis in Shell Eggs During Production,
Storage, and Transportation, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,030 (July 9, 2009).
57
See infra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
58
Keep America’s Food Safe: The Case for Increased Funding at the FDA,
CENTER FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INT., http://www.cspinet.org/foodsafety/fdafunding.html
(last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
59
See Helena Bottemiller, Obama Boosts FDA Food Safety in FY2011
Budget, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/
02/obama-boosts-food-safety-in-fy2011-budget/.
60
See, e.g., Molly Peterson, Food-Safety Funding Battle Looms as Obama
Prepares to Sign Reform Bill, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-04/food-safety-funding-battle-looms-as-obamaprepares-to-sign-reform-bill.html.
61
See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 2, 8
n.32 (2010); William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1590-91 (2007) (“Agencies may be able
to secure expanded budgets or even engage in outright favoritism to affected industry in
exchange for the usual rewards of regulatory capture—electoral support for the
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an industry viewpoint in the FDA and the USDA may produce
lax enforcement and a reliance on industry self-regulation,
even when it may not be the best approach for the public.62 This
phenomenon can be explicit, where there is an actual flow of
individuals between industry and decision-making regulatory
positions, or implicit, which involves more attenuated but no
less real connections between decision makers and industry.63
Under some circumstances, citizen-impact litigation can
address some of these regulatory shortcomings and be a useful
counterpart to government regulation.

administration in power, revolving doors from agencies to industry, and a reduced risk of
embarrassment that might result from more adversarial modes of regulatory exchange.”).
62
For example, the mission statement of the USDA contains a provision that
makes such industry pressure a mandate, rather than an eventuality—the agency is
charged both with expanding and protecting agricultural markets, as well as enhancing food
safety. Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., supra note 9. While in theory prevention of
foodborne illness is entirely consistent with improving the economics of agriculture, the
USDA’s main priority is split between economic development and public health. For another
example, the New York Times recently reported that the USDA was assisting in the marketing
of cheese, while simultaneously discouraging its consumption in an anti-obesity campaign.
Michael Moss, While Warning About Fat, U.S. Pushes Cheese Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/us/07fat.html?scp=1&sq=domino+
cheese&st=nyt.
As to the FDA, there is much scholarship on the effect that industry pressure
has had on the FDA’s nutrition policy. See generally Emily J. Schaffer, Is the Fox Guarding
the Henhouse? Who Makes the Rules in American Nutrition Policy?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
371 (2002) (collecting scholarship). And, regarding food safety, until the FSMA was passed,
the FDA relied on voluntary recall for adulterated products. Market incentives support such
a policy because industry is invested in the public perception of the safety of its products.
Nevertheless, voluntary recall power does not remedy industry reluctance to insure the
safety of its own food. See, e.g., Miriam Falco, FDA: Peanut Plant Knew Product Was
Tainted with Salmonella, CNN (Jan. 28, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-01-28/health/
salmonella.outbreak_1_peanut-corporation-salmonella-typhimurium-peanut-plant?_s=
PM:HEALTH (Peanut Corporation of America shipped product it knew was tainted with
salmonella). The FSMA does give the FDA mandatory recall authority, although recalls are
still reactionary rather than precautionary.
63
See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1285 (2006). The question of whether
agency capture is actually a problem, or more a perceived problem, and the effects
thereof, has been amply discussed in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill,
Capture Theory and the Courts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 163, 183-84 (1992-93); see also Bagley & Revesz, supra, at 1284-92 (arguing that
the theory of regulatory capture does not adequately explain the reality of
governmental agency processes).
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THE ABSENCE OF AN IMPACT LITIGATION CULTURE IN
THE CONTEXT OF FOOD SAFETY

Food-safety-impact litigation, however, is rare. Over the
last forty years, fewer than twenty published cases fall into
this category.64
64

I searched for cases by citizens or organizational plaintiffs against the
government seeking to change regulation for the stated purpose of improving public
health, as well as state and federal cases brought against the USDA, HHS, or the FDA
since 1970 that concerned food safety, and found the following fourteen cases: Levine v.
Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2009) (citizens brought suit against Secretary of
Agriculture challenging rule excluding poultry from Humane Methods of Slaughter
Act; Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of Article III standing; discussed, infra Part
III.B.2); Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. USDA,
499 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2007) (trade organization challenged USDA regulation of the
importation of Canadian cattle; court deferred to agency; discussed, infra Part III.B.3);
Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 2003) (citizen sued USDA to challenge refusal
to prohibit downed cattle from entering food supply; Second Circuit found standing;
discussed, infra Part III.B.1); Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Veneman, 284
F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (organizations representing government employees
challenged a new provisional inspection system instituted by the USDA of meat and
poultry carcasses; court ultimately found that this new, but provisional and temporary
system was adequate; standing not discussed); Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118 (8th
Cir. 1996) (poultry consumers and red meat producers challenged alleged
inconsistencies between regulation of meat and poultry; court found case reviewable
under APA; discussed in detail, infra Part III.C); Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (consumer and public interest groups challenged labeling of raw fish and
produce; court found FDA’s industry standard to be reasonable); Simpson v. Young, 854
F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (consumer advocacy public interest group challenged FDA
conclusion that a certain color additive was safe; court deferred to agency decision);
Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (public interest groups
and consumers sued the FDA for its promulgation of “action levels” instead of formal
tolerance levels for aflatoxins, a carcinogen, in corn; after the United States Supreme
Court decided tolerance levels were not necessary, Court of Appeals found the action
levels nevertheless needed to be promulgated pursuant to notice and comment
rulemaking; standing conceded “under the broad grant of standing” found in the
FFDCA and the APA); Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. Bergland, 631 F.2d 1353 (8th
Cir. 1980) (trade organizations representing pork producers and meat packers
challenged new USDA regulations allowing certain products not cured with nitrates
(such as hot dogs) to be sold under their traditional names; court found regulation
valid); Pub. Citizen v. Foreman, 631 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (consumer advocacy
public interest group sought declaratory judgment that nitrites were an unsafe food
additive; court held that nitrites fell under the prior sanction exception to FDA
responsibility; discussed infra note 162); Am. Pub. Health Assoc. v. Butz, 511 F.2d 331
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (public health advocacy organization sued Secretary of Agriculture for
allegedly violating the Wholesome Meat Act and the Wholesome Poultry Products Act
by refusing to affix safe handling instructions to raw meat and poultry; court held that
labels as currently written were not false and misleading); Schuck v. Butz, 500 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citizen sued the Secretary of Agriculture seeking repeal of
regulations permitting the use of nitrates and nitrites in meat products; court held that
appellants had to petition for a rulemaking); Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229
(D.D.C. 1987) (consumer advocacy public interest group petitioned HHS for rule
banning interstate sales of raw milk; court agreed with petitioners; discussed in detail,
infra Part III.C); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 632 F. Supp. 220
(D.D.C. 1986) (consumer advocacy public interest group challenged provisional listing
of nine color additives as safe for use; court held the listing to be consistent with
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The paucity of citizen suits is not explained by the lack
of citizen-suit provisions in the statutes regulating food safety,65
nor by the absence of a private right of action under the
FFDCA,66 the FMIA,67 or the PPIA.68 A viable alternative for
plaintiffs is to sue under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), which prescribes procedural safeguards and establishes
judicial review over federal regulatory agencies.69 And although
such litigation will, and does, confront justiciability barriers—
including challenges to standing and to the suits’ justiciability
under the APA—these barriers are surmountable. Food-safety
citizen litigation can be brought, and can be won, as
demonstrated by prior cases.
This is not to minimize the advantage that a statutory
citizen-suit provision provides a plaintiff. Citizen-suit
provisions generally permit “any person” to sue certain
persons, including government officials, who violate certain
legal obligations, or who fail to carry out nondiscretionary
duties.70 Judicial review over agency decision making is
human health, not unreasonably delayed under the APA, and the Delaney Clause
challenge to be unripe). In all probability there are other such cases I could not find,
and which most likely were dismissed at an early stage for lack of final agency action,
or a similar procedural problem.
I did not include here a citizen suit challenging the FDA’s decision to allow the
use of certain color additive dyes in external cosmetic use, because cosmetics are not food.
Nevertheless this suit involved an interpretation of the Delaney Clause, which prohibits the
listing of color additives, ingested or not, if they are found to induce cancer in man or
animal, and thus affects food safety. The citizen suit in this case was successful, in that the
court determined that the FDA’s reading of the Delaney Clause to permit a de minimis
exception was unreasonable, and that the dyes therefore needed to be delisted. Pub. Citizen
v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Nor did I include the private litigation that CSPI
has been involved in, although this certainly touches on food safety.
65
See Poultry and Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-472 (2006);
Federal Meat Inspection Act, Egg Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2006).
66
See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 806-07 (1986).
67
See Mario’s Butcher Shop & Food Ctr., Inc. v. Armour & Co., 574 F. Supp.
653, 654 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
68
See Rogers v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 308 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2002) (Poultry
Products Inspection Act provides no private right of action).
69
Section 702 of the APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702
(2006). Suits under this provision of the APA cannot be brought for money damages, but
only for declaratory or injunctive relief, and must challenge “agency action made
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in a
court.” Id. § 704. Section 701 carves out two exceptions to judicial reviewability: (1) when
“statutes preclude judicial review”; or (2) when “agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law.” Id. § 701. Litigants bringing suit under section 702 of the APA must
still meet constitutional and prudential standing requirements, including demonstrating
injury in fact and meeting the zone of interests test, both described below.
70
See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604 (2006); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006).

918

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:3

limited,71 and courts may be reluctant to delve too deeply into
an agency’s decision-making processes, especially if the
decision at issue contains technical or scientific aspects.72
Whereas a plaintiff suing under a citizen-suit provision must
show a violation of legal obligations under the relevant statute
to win, a plaintiff suing pursuant to the APA must show that
the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious.73 But, as the
presence of a citizen-suit provision does not guarantee a
plaintiff’s ability to bring suit, in that he or she must still
satisfy the constitutional and prudential requirements of
Article III, neither does the absence of such a provision
foreclose food-safety-impact litigation.
Citizen-suit provisions also provide for attorney’s fees to
the prevailing party.74 Although it may be possible for litigants
against the federal government to be awarded fees and costs
under other statutory provisions,75 it is unrealistic to think that
organizations dedicated to food safety and committed to impact
litigation would rely on attorney-fee provisions for their
survival in any event. Consider environmental organizations
dedicated to impact litigation. Although the availability of
attorney’s fees may assist in perpetuating organizations
funding environmental-impact litigation, these fees are not
necessary to the survival of these groups, nor are they the focus
of litigation. These organizations are instead sustained through
private donations and grants.76 Notably, environmental-impact
litigation began before the passage of environmental legislation
containing citizen-suit provisions.77
71

See 5 U.S.C. § 706.
See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and
Judicial Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011).
73
5 U.S.C. § 706.
74
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act).
75
See Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006) (allowing
fees against the federal government “unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust.”); see also Hanover Potato Prods., Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that a coalition of fresh potato producers, which was the prevailing party in its
litigation against the FDA regarding a regulation, was entitled to fees under the Equal
Access to Justice Act).
76
William W. Buzbee, The Story of Laidlaw, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES
231 (Foundation Press 2005).
77
See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965). The Natural Resource Defense Council began its environmental
litigation work before the environmental laws were passed, sometimes using centuryold statutes. See JOHN H. ADAMS & ET AL., A FORCE FOR NATURE 53 (Chronicle Books
2010) (describing NRDC litigation regarding stream channelization, brought pursuant
to the 1899 Refuse Act).
72
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Food safety significantly overlaps with environmental
protection. Beyond the actual commonalities between the two
subjects—i.e., more responsible stewardship of land will lead to
a safer food supply; cleaner agriculture and husbanding
practices result in cleaner land—both food safety and
environmental
protection
involve
compulsory
and
comprehensive participatory systems. Everyone has to breathe
the air, drink the water, live on the earth, and somehow
nourish themselves. Beyond that, of course, individual
discretion exists as to where, how, and what, although the
extent of this individual discretion varies according to
numerous demographic factors.
There are certain key differences between food safety
and environmental protection, however, which have led to a
vigorous impact litigation culture in the context of
environmental law, and a virtual absence of one in the context
of food safety. These differences include: (a) the nature of food
versus that of the environment, and (b) the disparate historical
development of (i) the regulatory structures overlaying the
food-safety system and the management of the environment,
and (ii) the advocacy movements concerned with issues
touching on food safety and with issues regarding
environmental protection.
A.

The Nature of Food

Although both food and the environment involve
compulsory systems, an individual’s relationship with each
system is quite different. To begin with, there is no seemingly
helpless entity in the food-safety context that needs an
advocate on its behalf. Since its proposal in a law review article
by Christopher Stone in 1972, and its citation in Justice
Douglas’s dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton, the concept of trees
and rocks having standing to sue in American law is a concept
that, although repeatedly mocked, has had remarkable
resilience and has even been recently revived.78 It is argued
that, if inanimate objects and spaces cannot protect themselves
in court, it stands to reason that advocates are needed to
78

Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
741-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). On recent revival of the idea, see Noaki Schwartz,
Effort May Give Birds, Bees, Trees Legal Standing, SFGATE.COM (Dec. 4, 2010),
http://boston.com/news/local/maine/articles/2010/12/04/effort_may_give_birds_bees_trees_leg
al_standing/ (describing recent community ordinances giving nature legal standing).
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represent them. No one, however, has argued that a tomato
needs standing. Food itself is not perceived as requiring
protection outside of its relationship to the human consumer. A
consumer may choose to protect his consumption based on
numerous factors—religious, cultural, economic, and health—
but the food supply has no independent moral content. An
exception to this is the prevention of animal cruelty, which is
invested with a moral value beyond the consumption of
animals by humans, and there is a vigorous tradition of
advocacy surrounding the prevention of animal cruelty. The
American Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was
founded in 1866, a quarter century before the founding of the
Sierra Club. Animal welfare organizations have, in fact,
brought a significant amount of the small body of existing foodsafety impact cases.
Moreover, environmental protection is about the
protection of physical space. Pre-harm environmental litigation
is focused on protecting a particular space, whether it is an
individual’s home, or somewhere imbued with environmental
value.79 Geographic proximity to the area at issue allows a court
a measurable index to assess actual injury.80
Real property holds a unique and exalted place in
American history and the American psyche, and consequently,
in American law. The narrative of development in this country is
one of territorial conquest, and the closing of the United States
frontier in 1890 was a significant event.81 Property ownership
has long been an American success symbol, fostered by
governmental policies supporting homeownership.82 The law also

79

See, e.g., Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 728 (action by the Sierra Club to prevent
recreational development in the Sequoia National Forest); Forest Voice, LLC v. Town of
Forest, Civ. Action No. 11-CV-100, U.S. Dist. Ct., Western District of Wisconsin, complaint
filed Feb. 9, 2011, available at http://articles.law360.s3.amazonaws.com/0224000/
224907/ee.pdf (citizens sued an energy company over plans to build a wind turbine system
in their town). Even pre-harm Endangered Species Act litigation concerns habitat
protection. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992).
80
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 181-82 (2000).
81
See, e.g., FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER, HISTORY, FRONTIER, AND SECTION
(University of New Mexico Press 1993). Turner claimed that the frontier was the most
important force in American society, culture, and politics, and that its disappearance
would gravely affect the national character and mindset.
82
See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 163 (2006) (provision of the Internal Revenue Code
allowing a home mortgage interest deduction). Of course, the emphasis on home buying
has come under scrutiny since the housing crisis. Binyamin Appelbaum, Administration
Calls for Cutting Aid to Home Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2011, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/business/12housing.html?scp=2&sq=housing+crisis+
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treats property uniquely, above and beyond necessity. For
example, if a court, either state or federal, takes jurisdiction over
real property, it may be able to enjoin any other court from
continuing adjudication of the same property.83 Although the
underlying policy reason behind this—to avoid inconsistent
determinations over the same piece of property—is logical, it
does not explain the absence of such safeguards over other
adjudicatory subjects, such as bank accounts, where inconsistent
judgments would carry the same detrimental consequences.84
On the other hand, food is largely divorced from its
origin—distributed and packaged as uniformly as possible so as to
disguise any indication of where it is from. One of the hallmarks
of our country’s food distribution system is its centralization, and
the inability to trace the origins of much of the domestic food
supply is one of the obstacles to minimizing the effect of foodborne
illness outbreaks.85 Acknowledging this, the Food Safety
Modernization Act includes a provision that enhances the
capacity of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to trace
food items for the purpose of improving the capacity of the
government to detect and respond to food-safety problems.86
The significance of food’s ubiquity and non-fixedness is
threefold. First, it may be difficult for courts to analogize to
environmental law in finding particularized injury to fulfill
Article III standing requirements for food-safety impact
litigants because there is no analog to the category of
geographic proximity. Second, food is seen as more fungible
than pieces of land. If a consumer believes that the regulatory
scheme overlaying a particular food product is unlawfully
inadequate, he may choose another comestible, whereas a
homeowner who believes an environmental agency is acting
unlawfully may have no recourse but to sell her property. This
may lead to decreased incentive to litigate for stronger

home+buying&st=nyt (discussing Obama administration’s proposal to make buying
homes more difficult for some Americans).
83
See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 235 (1972).
84
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 746-47 (Wolters Kluwer,
5th ed. 2007).
85
For example, cantaloupe grown on a Colorado farm caused a multi-state
outbreak of listeria poisoning in 2011. Authorities had difficulty, however, determining
to which states exactly the tainted cantaloupe were shipped, thus complicating the
attempt to stem the outbreak. See, e.g., Michael Booth, More States May Have Received
Listeria-Contaminated Cantaloupe, DENVER POST (Sept. 22, 2011, 3:35 PM),
http://www.denverpost.com/breakingnews/ci_18955276.
86
21 U.S.C. § 2223 (2006).
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regulation, because if an individual thinks chicken inspection is
inadequate, that individual can choose not to buy chicken.87
Third, because of the difficulty of knowing where one’s
food comes from, and the invisibility of the processes that led to
its packaging in its current consumable form, citizens have less
personal control over determining the source of any foodborne
illness. One cannot see the pathogens that spread foodborne
illness, nor is the consumer exposed to the production facility
where the pathogen originated. By contrast, even if the
pollutant itself targeted by environmental litigants is invisible,
it is most likely that its origin is not.88 This inability to selftrace in the food-safety context leads to the necessity for a
reliance on experts and scientific evidence at an early stage of
litigation, and is compounded in the case of impact litigation.
B.

The Disparate Historical Development of Food Safety
and Environmental Protection

Major milestones in American environmentalism,
including developments in the governmental management of
natural resources, as well as the ferment of citizen activity,
coincide roughly with major milestones in the developments of
a national food-safety regulatory regime. These milestones
generally took place at times of urbanization and technological
advancement, which led to actual threats on the country’s
natural resources and food supply, as well as to national
anxiety regarding threats to traditional ways of life, and
consequentially, to human health.
However, the regulatory and legislative structures
developed very differently in the two fields. In the context of
environmental protection, the government organized entities to
manage natural resources but major environmental legislation
was not passed until the early 1970s, whereas in the context of
food-safety regulation, we see the amendment and
supplementation of several major statutes that originated at
the beginning of the twentieth century. We also see that, in
environmental protection, citizen advocacy groups were always
an important counterpart to governmental regulation, a
situation that did not exist in the context of food safety.
87

Of course, consumer choice is constrained by numerous factors, including
cultural norms, economic realities, and governmental policy.
88
See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc.,
528 U.S. 167, 182-83 (2000).
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1. A Brief History of Environmental Protection in the
United States
The first wave of American environmentalism took place
at the turn of the twentieth century in reaction to a massive
increase in immigration and urbanization.89 From 1860 to 1890
the United States population increased from thirty-one million
to seventy-five million people, and between 1860 and 1900 the
number of people living in urban areas doubled from 20 percent
to 40 percent.90 In 1890, the United States Census Bureau
declared the United States frontier officially closed, and in 1893,
Frederick Jackson Turner articulated his famous thesis as to the
effect of the frontier, and its closing, on American history.91
Urbanization resulted in the need for the American people to
refashion their relationship with the natural resources of the
country.
A small group of prominent intellectuals and public
figures brought the perceived necessity for the conservation of
the American wilderness to the nation’s attention.92 The Sierra
Club was founded in 1892, and the National Audubon Society
in 1905. Theodore Roosevelt’s administration embarked on a
concerted campaign to forward the regulated use of resources
towards the goal of the fullest use for the present generation.93
Before Roosevelt left office in 1909, he worked with the head of
the Forest Service and the secretary of the interior to withdraw
over four million acres of the public domain from consideration
for private sale.94
In the 1930s, a series of natural disasters began to make
apparent the consequences that could ensue from the
unregulated exploitation of the nation’s resources. For
89

See MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE
CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 8 (MIT Press 1995).
90
ROBERT L. DORMAN, A WORD FOR NATURE: FOUR PIONEERING ENVIRONMENTAL
ADVOCATES, 1845-1913, at 130 (University of North Carolina Press 1998).
91
See TURNER, supra note 81.
92
See STEPHEN FOX, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT: JOHN MUIR
AND HIS LEGACY 110 (University of Wisconsin Press 1981). Historians of the American
environmental protection movement divide the early twentieth century environmental
movement into two strains, the conservationist—which measured nature’s value
according to its worth for mankind—and the preservationist—which was ecologic and
biocentric. See id. at 108; JOSEPH M. PETULLA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM:
VALUES, TACTICS, PRIORITIES 26 (Texas A & M Press 1980).
93
M. NELSON MCGEARY, GIFFORD PINCHOT: FORESTER-POLITICIAN 98
(Princeton University Press 1960); MICHAEL L. SMITH, PACIFIC VISIONS: CALIFORNIA
SCIENTISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1850-1915, at 174-82 (Yale University Press 1987).
94
MCGEARY, supra note 93, at 116-17.
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example, the dust storms of the 1930s, which rendered nine
million acres of formerly arable land unusable by 1938, were
partly the result of haphazard farming practices.95 After World
War II, several organizations concerned with conserving the
country’s natural resources became involved in major, and
public, environmental battles,96 and these organizations,
including the Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, had over
three hundred thousand members by 1960.97
It was not until the publication of Rachel Carson’s
monumentally influential book Silent Spring in 1962, however,
that the American populace was galvanized to the cause of
environmental protection. Silent Spring addressed the effects of
DDT and other pesticides on human health and the environment.98
The book was on the New York Times bestseller list for thirty-one
weeks and sold over a half million hardcover copies.99
The 1960s also saw the advent of strategic
environmental litigation brought by public interest groups as
administrative law challenges. Beginning with the 1965 case
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission, in which the Second Circuit allowed citizens
standing to sue under the Federal Power Act to overturn three
orders of the Federal Power Commission based on their
“interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
aspects of power development,”100 newly formed environmental
groups aggressively sought judicial review of administrative
action.101 The organizations bringing these challenges faced
hurdles, especially regarding their standing to sue (although
Scenic Hudson was a milestone in that regard), but pursued
suits nonetheless.102
Inspired by this movement, a flood of environmental
legislation was passed in the early 1970s.103 Congress intended
95

DONALD WORSTER, NATURE’S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS
221-53 (Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 1994).
96
KIRKPATRICK SALE, THE GREEN REVOLUTION: THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT, 1962-1992, at 5 (Hill & Wang 1993).
97
Id. at 5-6.
98
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1994) (1962).
99
SALE, supra note 96, at 4.
100
354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965).
101
David Sive, The Litigation Process in the Development of Environmental
Law (1995 Garrison Lecture), 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 727, 731 & n.20 (2002) (listing
pre-NEPA environmental cases).
102
A. Dan Tarlock, The Story of Calvert Cliffs, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
STORIES 81 (Foundation Press 2005).
103
This legislation includes the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006); the Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006);
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citizens and advocacy groups to have a role in enforcing the new
environmental legislation,104 and these statutes contain citizensuit provisions, a legal mechanism encouraging citizen actions
against polluters. These powerful provisions permit “any person”
to sue certain persons, including government officials, who violate
certain legal obligations, or who fail to carry out nondiscretionary
duties.105 The remedies available in such suits are injunctive relief,
civil penalties—which go to the federal treasury, and the recovery
of attorney’s fees and costs.106 The citizen-suit provisions were
written into environmental laws partly to encourage the very
litigation that was already taking place.107
2. A Brief History of Food-Safety Regulation in the
United States
The urbanization of the country that took place at the
turn of the twentieth century also resulted in massive changes
to the relationship between individuals and the food supply.
Consolidation of the food supply and the creation of
distribution networks became necessary to feed large
populations of people who could not grow their own food. The
end of the nineteenth century also saw extensive development
in food science, especially in the creation of new food
additives.108 At that time, only certain imported foods were
subject to federal regulation—all other food regulation was
state and local.109
Public awareness of the need for national regulation was
raised during the late nineteenth century by the head of the U.S.
Bureau of Chemistry, Harvey W. Wiley, M.D., who campaigned
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006); the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006); and
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
104
Indeed, environmental organizations assisted in the drafting of certain of
the new statutes. See ADAMS ET AL., supra note 77, at 51, 53 (explaining how two
members of the Natural Resources Defense Council helped to draft the 1977
amendments to the Clean Air Act); Tarlock, supra note 102, at 92 n.51 (recounting the
influence of Myron Cherry, an important anti-nuclear lawyer in the 1970s, on the
drafting of NEPA and its legislative history).
105
See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006); Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 7604; Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g).
106
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the existence of a citizensuit provision does not satisfy Article III standing requirements; a litigant must still
show injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability before her suit may proceed. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562, 571-78 (1992).
107
ADAMS ET AL., supra note 77, at 27.
108
FORTIN, supra note 20, at 5.
109
Hutt, supra note 21, at 6.
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for a federal food and drug law. The press also began to expose
some safety problems with commonly used food preservatives
and dyes.110 A series of damaging newspaper articles about the
food industry as well as the publication in 1905 of Upton
Sinclair’s The Jungle garnered public support for the national
regulation of the food supply, and in 1906, Congress passed the
Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act.111 The
Food and Drug Act was to be administered by the Bureau of
Chemistry within the USDA, and the FMIA by the Bureau of
Animal Industry, also within the USDA.112
The focus of each of the 1906 acts was to prevent the
adulteration of food, and the Food and Drugs Act included the
prohibition of additives that would be deleterious to human
health as well as of substances that would dilute the product
for the purpose of making the food cheaper to produce.113 The
Meat Inspection Act prohibited adulterated or misbranded
livestock products to be sold as food, and also mandated the
improvement of sanitation at slaughtering facilities, in
response to Sinclair’s book.114
The Bureau of Chemistry was split in 1927, with
regulatory functions, including responsibility for the 1906 Act,
taken over by the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration
(which became the FDA in 1930).115 Responsibility for the Meat
Inspection Act was not transferred, however, and authority for
its enforcement remained within the Department of
Agriculture. FDA officials began advocating for the
modernization of the 1906 Act in 1933,116 but passage of a new
bill was stalled until 1938.117 Precipitating passage of the 1938
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FFDCA) was the death
of over one hundred people in 1937 who had taken an antibiotic
that had been mixed with a sweet substance to improve its
110

FORTIN, supra note 20, at 5-6. Wiley established a “Poison Squad”—a group
of volunteers who consumed food additives, including boric acid and formaldehyde, to
assess their effects on the human body. Id. at 5; see also About FDA: Milestones in U.S.
Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/default.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
111
FORTIN, supra note 20, at 6.
112
Richard A. Merrill & Jeffrey K. Francer, Organizing Federal Food Safety
Regulation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 61, 78-79 (2000).
113
Hutt, supra note 21, at 6.
114
FORTIN, supra note 20, at 6.
115
About FDA: Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/
ucm128305.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2012).
116
Hutt, supra note 21, at 7.
117
HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 13.
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taste, but had never been tested for safety.118 In 1940, the FDA
was transferred from the USDA to the Federal Security
Agency, and in 1988, to the Department of Health and Human
Services, with a commissioner of food and drugs appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.119
Since 1938, the FFDCA has been amended hundreds of
times.120 Significantly, during World War II, food processing
technology was developed to preserve and transport food for
war, and this massive alteration in the general food supply led
to public concern about the addition of synthetic ingredients
and potential carcinogens to the food supply.121 The FDA
reacted by passing the 1958 Food Additives Amendment and
the 1960 Color Additive Amendment. The 1970s and 1980s saw
such food-safety amendments to the FFDCA as the Low-Acid
Food Processing Regulations (1973).122 The Nutritional Labeling
and Education Act was passed in 1990.123
As to meat and poultry, the Poultry Products Inspection
Act (PPIA) was passed by Congress in 1957 in response to a
rapidly expanding poultry industry, which was also developing
poultry processing techniques. In 1967, the FMIA was amended
as the Wholesome Meat Act, which requires the inspection of all
meat, and the PPIA was amended in 1968. In 1971, the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service, a division of the USDA,
was charged with meat and poultry inspection, and this was
assigned to the Food Safety and Quality Service in 1977. The
Food Safety and Quality Service became the Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) in 1981.124
Food-safety advocates have never embraced impact
litigation as a way to achieve food-safety goals. Even foodsafety organizations claiming to use litigation as a strategy to
achieve their goals use it sparingly. For example, the Center
for Food Safety, which was established in 1997, and is a “nonprofit public interest and environmental advocacy membership
118
119

Id.; FORTIN, supra note 20, at 6.
About FDA: Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, supra

note 115.
120

See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 25, at 14-15.
FORTIN, supra note 20, at 7; HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 25,
at 393-94. Concern about carcinogens and pesticides was also, at this time, galvanizing
the environmental movement.
122
Low Acid Regulations, 21 C.F.R. §§ 108.25, 108.35 (2010).
123
FORTIN, supra note 20, at 8.
124
About FSIS: Agency History, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. FOOD SAFETY &
INSPECTION SERV., http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_Fsis/Agency_History/index.asp (last
modified Nov. 7, 2011).
121
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organization [that] combines multiple tools and strategies in
pursuing its goals, including litigation and legal petitions for
rulemaking,”125 is listed as a party in fewer than forty cases
since its founding.126 The Center for Science in the Public
Interest, an influential consumer advocacy organization
focused on improving public health, nutrition, and food safety,
is listed as a party in under twenty cases since its founding in
1971.127 By comparison, since its founding in 1967, the
Environmental Defense Fund is listed as a party in
approximately 280, and since 1970, the year of its founding,
NRDC is listed as a party in over 750 cases. Since 1997, when
the Center for Food Safety was founded, the NRDC is listed as
a party in over 400 cases.128
This comparison of impact litigation in the realms of
environmental protection and food safety serves to illustrate
how environmental advocates and food-safety advocates have
different approaches to advocacy and effective means of
change.129 It is crucial to emphasize that the difference cannot
be explained by the lack of citizen-suit provisions in the foodsafety laws. As mentioned above, the passage of environmental
legislation in the 1970s was not the beginning of
environmental-impact litigation. Although environmentalimpact litigation accelerated greatly after the passage of
environmental legislation, strategic litigation had been
imagined and implemented in the decade prior, as
environmental advocacy organizations, both old and new,
began to litigate to protect the environment.130
125

About Us, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY, http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/
about (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
126
Result yielded from a Westlaw search performed on April 14, 2012. See
WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (search “ti(‘Center for Food Safety’)” in the “allcases”
database “after 1/1/1997”).
127
In 2005, CSPI hired Stephen Gardner to direct its food-safety litigation,
which is focused on private litigation against companies that refuse to take action to
improve food safety. This strategy has been remarkably successful in improving the
food safety of market-leading companies, as well as improving relationships between
these companies and advocacy organizations, such as CSPI. Telephone Interview with
Stephen Gardner (Jan. 5, 2011).
128
Results yielded from a Westlaw search performed on April 14, 2012. See
WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (search “ti(‘Environmental Defense Fund’)” in the
“allcases” database “after 1/1/1967”; “ti(‘Natural Resources Defense Council’)” in the
“allcases” database “after 1/1/1970”; and “ti(‘Natural Resources Defense Council’)” in
the “allcases” database “after 1/1/1997”).
129
See, e.g., Sive, supra note 101, at 729 (“In no other political and social
movement has litigation played such an important and dominant role [as in the
environmental movement].” (citation omitted)).
130
ADAMS & ET AL., supra note 77, at 53; Tarlock, supra note 102, at 82 n.15;
Sive, supra note 101, at 731.
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Nor can the disparity be explained by pointing to the
superior funding of the environmental advocacy groups—
although the NRDC was founded in part with money from the
Ford Foundation, this money was granted after the idea to focus
on litigation was formed, not before.131 It may be impossible to
actually identify why food-safety litigation is not a prevalent form
of advocacy and activism, but it is important to note that the
absence of the development of such a tradition was not dictated by
legal constraints, nor prescribed by social circumstances.
III.

JUSTICIABILITY BARRIERS TO FOOD-SAFETY-IMPACT
LITIGATION

Food-safety-impact litigation faces difficulties getting
into
court
because
it
involves
multiple—including
associational—parties, probabilistic harms, widely-shared
harms, and requests for prospective relief. The judicial system
is still struggling to adapt traditional doctrines of justiciability
to such litigation, even though such litigation has been ongoing
in various contexts since at least the middle of last century.132
Although it is relatively uncontroversial that suits based on
uncertain injury can be heard by federal courts,133 the questions
of who can bring such suits, when they are ready for suit, and
where the suits can be brought are still vigorously contested,
with the answers changing by jurisdiction, and over time.
These questions of who, when, and where must be determined
before courts can reach the merits.
The justiciability barriers most likely to be faced by
food-safety impact litigants are standing challenges and
challenges to justiciability under the APA.134
A.

Standing

Standing determines whether a federal court litigant is
the proper party to bring the suit before the court.135 The notion

131

ADAMS & ET AL., supra note 77, at 17-24.
All social justice litigation falls into this model, including litigation in the
fields of civil rights and environmental protection.
133
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Brandt v. Vill. of Winnetka,
612 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2010).
134
Although ripeness and mootness challenges in this context are conceivable,
indeed likely, I focus here on the actual cases and the barriers with which courts have
actually grappled when dealing with this type of litigation.
132
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of standing has both constitutional and prudential dimensions.
A court must first determine if the litigant meets the criteria of
Article III: (1) whether the litigant has suffered an injury-infact, which must be “concrete and particularized,” and “actual
or imminent”; (2) whether the alleged injury is fairly traceable
to the harm targeted; and (3) whether the remedy sought is
likely to redress the alleged injury.136 Prudential concerns
include prohibitions against the litigation of generalized
grievances and litigating the rights of third parties, and
determining whether the litigant is within the zone of interests
of the statute at issue.137
In 1992, the Supreme Court made it more difficult for
impact plaintiffs to establish standing, even when they are
suing pursuant to a citizen-suit provision. In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, the Court denied standing to several
environmental organizations challenging a regulation as
violating the Endangered Species Act.138 The Court found that
the organizations did not adequately allege injury in fact.139
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, wrote, “when the
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or
inaction he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is
ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”140
Most significantly, the decision prohibited Congress
from statutorily creating a legal injury and thereby bestowing
standing upon citizens.141 The Court held that a citizen-suit
provision did not eliminate the need for a plaintiff to show that
she has sustained direct and personal injury.142 In Lujan, the
135

For a comprehensive discussion and critique of the separation of powers
rationale for the standing doctrine, see Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61
STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008).
136
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Whether
these three criteria actually stem directly from Article III, or are themselves judgemade and perhaps misguided, is a matter of discussion among commentators. See, e.g.,
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988); Sunstein,
supra note 63, at 185-86. Nevertheless, used as they have been as Article III criteria for
the last four decades, they are, at this point, accepted as constitutional.
137
See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
138
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578.
139
A plurality of the Court also found that the plaintiffs had not established
redressability. Id. at 568-71.
140
Id. at 562 (citation omitted).
141
The Court explained that Congress could still create legally cognizable
injuries, i.e., it could “elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de
facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Id. at 578. What Congress could
not do was “abandon . . . the requirement that the party seeking review must himself
have suffered an injury.” Id. (citation omitted).
142
Id. at 573.
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Court of Appeals had held that the organizational petitioners
had adequately alleged injury in fact because they alleged a
procedural injury—that the Secretary of the Interior had failed
to consult as required by the ESA—and that this procedural
injury was adequate because of the citizen-suit provision, even
if the petitioners failed to allege a personal injury.143 The Lujan
Court rejected this view, explaining that
[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest
in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an “individual
right” vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from
the president to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important
constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”144

The Court held that a litigant must show that she herself had
suffered “injury in fact,” and had a tangible and concrete stake,
beyond the vindication of a right as a citizen, in the outcome of
the case.145
By requiring a showing of personalized injury-in-fact
even when alleging procedural injury, the Court in Lujan made
it significantly more difficult for the beneficiaries of regulation
to protect their interests. Commentators predicted that citizensuit environmental litigation would be severely restricted, or
even eliminated, and the environmental advocacy community
began to plan different tactical routes toward the enforcement
and strengthening of environmental litigation.146 The Court
reinforced its strict interpretation of Article III standing in
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, which held that
plaintiffs did not have Article III standing based on a lack of
redressability when the violations for which the plaintiffs sued
had occurred solely in the past.147
The standing cases of the late 1980s and early 1990s
demonstrate a general tightening of standing law and a trend
toward the restriction of access to courts for regulatory
beneficiaries in public law litigation. This trend did not,
however, reflect a unified court, nor consensus among the
justices, and in the late 1990s the Court began to relax its
approach to standing.

143
144
145
146
147

Id. at 571, 572.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 575-78.
Buzbee, supra note 76, at 214-20.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109-10 (1998).
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In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services, the Court, with a vigorous dissent by Justice Scalia,
the author of the Lujan and Steel Co. decisions, backed away
from the broadest implications of the Lujan decision, and
granted standing to several environmental organizations that
had instituted a citizen suit against a company for alleged
Clean Water Act violations.148 The Court held that the
availability of civil penalties against the company was
adequate to provide redressability for the citizen plaintiffs
because of the potential that such penalties would deter future
violations, although injunctive relief against the company was
not available because the company had ceased violations since
the commencement of the litigation.149 Distinguishing Steel Co.,
the Court explained that in Laidlaw the violations had not
ceased prior to suit as in Steel Co., but had been ongoing at the
time suit was commenced.150 Moreover, the Court found that the
absence of evidence of injury to the environment was irrelevant
to the injury-in-fact analysis because the plaintiffs were
harmed by the lessening of the aesthetic and recreational
values of the area.151
After the Court’s movement away from its extremely
restrictive standing decisions of the early 1990s, it appears that
citizen suits were once again viable. Laidlaw and other
contemporaneous cases152 signaled the Court’s return to deference
to legislatively defined injuries, and thereby wedged the doors to
the courtroom back open for legislative beneficiaries.153
The Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA further
affirmed this trend. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court found
that Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA’s
refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor
148

528 U.S. 167 (2000).
Id. at 173-74.
150
Id. at 187-88.
151
Id. at 181.
152
See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
153
In Akins, a group of voters had challenged a Federal Election Commission’s
determination that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) was not a
“political committee” as defined by statute, and, consequentially, that AIPAC did not
have to disclose certain information. See id. at 13-14. The Court held that the
petitioners had standing to challenge the FEC’s determination because Congress had
specifically granted such parties the right to sue; the statute in question contained a
provision that “any person who believes a violation of this Act . . . has occurred, may
file a Complaint with the Commission.” Id. at 19 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (1971)).
The Court wrote that “[t]he ‘injury in fact’ that respondents have suffered consists of
their inability to obtain information . . . that, on respondents’ view of the law, the
statute requires that AIPAC make public.” Id. at 21.
149

2012]

NOT SICK YET

933

vehicles under the Clean Air Act.154 The Court provided
Massachusetts with “special solicitude in [the] standing
analysis” based on its sovereign status,155 but also found, with a
potentially wide reach, that climate-change risks pose a
concrete and particularized injury to Massachusetts as a
landowner, even though the harm may be widely shared, and
that the alleged injury (global warming) would be lessened by
the requested remedy (a reduction in motor vehicles emissions),
if not eliminated.156 The full reach of the Court’s standing and
redressability analyses remains to be seen.157
The zone-of-interests test is also significant in any
discussion of food-safety-impact litigation. This test is a
prudential standing requirement fashioned by the Supreme
Court providing that the interest alleged by the plaintiff must
arguably be within the zone of interests protected by the statute
or constitutional provision at issue.158 To satisfy this test,
congressional intent to benefit the plaintiff is not required.159 In
1997, the Supreme Court found that the citizen-suit provision of
the Endangered Species Act negated the zone-of-interests test in
relation to that statute.160 In the same case, the Court also noted
the “generous review provisions” of the APA, and clarified that
the zone-of-interests test should be assessed, not in relation to
the overall purpose of the statute at issue, but rather in relation
to the specific provision relied upon.161
B.

Standing in Food-Safety-Impact Litigation

Standing is a critical issue in food-safety-impact cases.
Three of the six post-1992 decisions in food-safety impact cases

154

Massachusetts v. E.P.A, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
For a discussion of the potential implications of the Court’s reliance on
Massachusetts’ sovereign status in its standing analysis, see Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State
Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273 (2007).
156
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-23, 525.
157
Maxwell L. Stearns argues that the Roberts Court will continue to expand
standing doctrine in Standing at the Crossroads: The Roberts Court in Historical
Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875 (2008).
158
See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
159
Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479,
492 (1998).
160
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 166 (1997). It is unclear whether this
holding applies to all statutes with citizen-suit provisions or is confined to the ESA.
See, e.g., Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. Dep’t
of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1102 n.17 (9th Cir. 2005).
161
Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163 (citation omitted).
155
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that I found involved standing issues.162 Each of these cases was
a challenge to agency action or inaction brought for the
ostensible purpose of minimizing the risk of foodborne illness
in the United States. One survived a motion to dismiss by
demonstrating injury in fact, the second survived an injury in
fact challenge only to be dismissed for a lack of redressability,
and the third had one of its claims dismissed because the
plaintiffs failed to show that they were within the zone of
interests protected by the statute.
1. Using Increased Risk of Harm as a Means to Show
Injury-in-Fact in Food-Safety-Impact Cases
Plaintiffs in food-safety-impact suits must find a way to
show that they have suffered concrete and particularized injury
from the challenged regulation although they have not
contracted a foodborne illness.163 Although they may represent
themselves as a consumer of the regulated food, they must
show that their grievance is more than a generalized one.164
Several courts have held that an allegation of increased risk of
injury due to a challenged agency action suffices to show such a
concrete and particularized injury, but this trend has mainly,
although not always, been confined to the environmental
context. In Baur v. Veneman, however, a 2003 case regarding
mad cow disease, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court’s dismissal of the case for lack of Article III standing,
finding that increased risk of harm—based on the increased

162

See supra note 64. I confined my discussion to post-1992 cases because
cases involving a standing analysis but decided pre-1992 are less useful in determining
whether food-safety-impact litigation is currently viable. For example, in Public Citizen v.
Foreman, a 1980 case, a public interest organization and several of its members sought a
declaratory judgment from both the FDA and the USDA that nitrites were an unsafe food
additive, especially in bacon, but faced a standing challenge. The D.C. Circuit found
plaintiffs’ allegation that nitrite-free bacon was not available at a reasonable price to be
an adequate injury-in-fact. 631 F.2d 969, 974 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Post Lujan, the court
may have more strictly analyzed plaintiffs’ standing. Whether such an injury would be
sufficiently concrete or particularized is unclear. Moreover, whether such an injury is the
type protected by the relevant statutes is also ambiguous, and the plaintiffs may have
failed the prudential zone-of-interests standing test.
163
Particularized means that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal
and individual way.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992).
164
This is not to say that the asserted injury may not be widely shared. A
widely shared harm may still be a particularized one. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v.
Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) (“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the
Court has found ‘injury in fact.’”).
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risk of contracting a foodborne disease—satisfied the injury in
fact requirement in the context of food and drug safety suits.165
The plaintiff in this case, Michael Baur, challenged the
USDA’s and the FDA’s allowance of “downed” cattle into the
food supply.166 “Downed” cattle are cattle that are too sick to
stand or walk before slaughter, and, at the time, USDA
regulations allowed downed cattle to enter the food supply after
inspection. Baur alleged that downed cattle were more likely to
carry transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs),
which are progressive neurological diseases.167 The most
common of these is bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE),
which is known as “mad cow disease.”168 Baur claimed that the
downed cattle policy violated both the FMIA and the FFDCA.
After Baur’s petition to the USDA and the FDA was
denied, he brought suit in district court under the APA seeking
judicial review of the FSIS’s decision.169 Baur claimed standing
165

Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 2003).
In 1998, Michael Baur and Farm Sanctuary, Inc., an animal protection
organization, filed a petition with the USDA and the FDA requesting that the agencies
“label all downed cattle as adulterated,” under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FFDCA), Section 342(a)(5). Baur, 352 F.3d at 628. This section of the FFDCA
provides that any food that is “the product of a diseased animal” is adulterated. 21
U.S.C. § 342 (a)(5) (2006). The FFDCA prohibits the manufacture, delivery, receipt, or
introduction of adulterated food “into interstate commerce.” Id. § 331.
167
Baur, 352 F.3d at 627-28.
168
Id. at 627.
169
Michael Baur originally brought suit with Farm Sanctuary, Inc., an animal
welfare organization. Farm Sanctuary claimed that its members were injured when they
observed the treatment of animals at slaughterhouses. The district court dismissed Farm
Sanctuary’s claims because it had failed to state an interest within the zone of interests of
the FMIA. Farm Sanctuary did not appeal its dismissal on standing grounds, and the
Second Circuit opinion only discusses Baur. For that reason, I refer only to Baur,
although he was joined by Farm Sanctuary at early stages of the litigation. See Farm
Sanctuary, Inc. v. Veneman, 221 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Note that there is no requirement in the Article III injury-in-fact standing
inquiry that the plaintiff’s alleged reason for bringing suit is genuine. The court does
not address whether Baur’s alleged injury—increased risk of foodborne illness—is
genuine, or, in other words, if that is Baur’s real motive for being before the court,
which in this case, was open to question. Farm Sanctuary is a prominent animal
protection organization, founded in 1986 by Gene Baur “to combat the abuses of factory
farming and to encourage a new awareness and understanding about ‘farm animals.’”
About Us, FARM SANCTUARY, http://farmsanctuary.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 13,
2012). The organization opposed what it saw as the unusually cruel practice of
dragging a cow that has collapsed on the way to the slaughterhouse to be killed. Robert
Terenzi, Jr., When Cows Fly: Expanding Cognizable Injury-in-Fact and Interest Group
Litigation, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1561 (2009). Many of the members of Farm
Sanctuary, however, were vegan. For this reason, Michael Baur, Gene Baur’s brother
and a Fordham Law professor, joined the case to provide a meat-eating plaintiff. Id. A
court may delve deeper into a plaintiff’s asserted reason for bringing suit if there is a
disjunction between an association’s stated reason and the main purposes for the
association’s existence. If the association’s purpose for existence does not fall into the
zone of interests protected by the statute at issue, the association’s suit may be
166
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based on his status as a consumer of meat who was at
increased risk of contracting a foodborne illness because of the
USDA’s policies regarding downed cattle.170 The district court
dismissed Baur’s claims for lack of Article III standing, finding
that because there was, as yet, no evidence of BSE in the
United States, the harm that he alleged was too speculative
and not sufficiently particularized to support standing.171
The Second Circuit reversed. First, the court held that
Baur’s increased risk of harm claim was capable of satisfying
the injury in fact requirement.172 Baur sued under the FMIA
and the FFDCA, and the court recognized that the purpose of
these statutes is, in part, to protect the nation’s food supply
and minimize the risk from dangerous food.173 There was a
“tight connection” between the injury alleged and the allegedly
violated statutes.174 The court explained that
[a]lthough this type of injury has been most commonly recognized in
environmental cases, the reasons for treating enhanced risk as
sufficient injury-in-fact in the environmental context extend by
analogy to consumer food and drug safety suits. Like threatened
environmental harm, the potential harm from exposure to dangerous
food products or drugs “is by nature probabilistic,” yet an
unreasonable exposure to risk may itself cause cognizable injury.175

The court also found that Baur had shown that he
himself faced a credible harm because “the probability of harm
which a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to allege a
cognizable injury-in-fact logically varies with the severity of the
probable harm.”176 Thus because of the severity of contracting
dismissed for lack of standing. See Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United
Stockgrowers of Am. v. Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2005).
170
Baur, 352 F.3d at 630.
171
Id. at 631.
172
Id. at 636.
173
Id. at 634-35.
174
See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221
(1988). Fletcher advocates a return to the “legal interest” test for standing, which asks
only whether the plaintiff has a legal right bestowed by the legal provision under which
he is suing, and if so, does not require an injury in fact. He writes that the APA was
meant to provide a flexible standing rule, and that if a litigant bases suit on a statute,
the court should look to the relevant statute to determine whether the litigant should
have standing, not whether the litigant has suffered an “injury in fact.” Id. at 255-65.
Although not throwing over the injury in fact requirement, the Second Circuit’s
decision in Baur incorporates Fletcher’s viewpoint by looking at the degree of
connection between the injury alleged and the statutes implicated.
175
Baur, 352 F.3d at 634 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper
Recycling, Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000)).
176
Id. at 637. The court explained that although the standard was lenient at
the pleading stage, the plaintiff could still not rely on conclusory allegations to show
standing. Id. This analysis may have been different had the case been decided after the
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mad cow disease, which is fatal and has no known cure, the
court held that the increase in risk may be moderate for
standing purposes. The court found the fact that Baur’s
allegations were supported by government studies supported
his claim for standing, as did the fact that his alleged increased
risk of harm resulted from an “established governmental
policy.”177 Incidentally, after the Second Circuit decision in Baur
was filed, on December 23, 2003, a cow in Washington State
was diagnosed with BSE.178 Soon thereafter, the USDA passed a
regulation banning downed cattle from the food supply,179 and
the case became moot.
While increased risk of harm is a widely recognized
basis for injury in fact, it is not entirely uncontroversial.180 The
Baur Court commented that “the courts of appeals have
generally recognized that threatened harm in the form of an
increased risk of future injury may serve as injury-in-fact for
Article III standing purposes,” and that “[w]ithout questioning
standing, the Supreme Court has decided cases in which it
appeared to assume that enhanced risk may cause real
injury.”181 However, as mentioned above, increased risk of harm
has rarely been used outside of environmental law cases.
Indeed, the Second Circuit refused to sanction the doctrine
generally, but instead held only that “[i]n the specific context of
United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), which instructed district courts
that a plaintiff needed factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level,” and must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Lower courts are now grappling with the implications
of applying the “plausibility standard,” to determinations regarding challenges to
subject matter jurisdiction, including standing challenges. See, e.g., Coal. for a
Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (E.D. Cal.
2010); Eugster v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, No. CV 09-357-SMM, 2010 WL 2926237 (W.D.
Wash. July 23, 2010).
177
Baur, 352 F.3d at 637. The dissent in Baur argued that Baur had not
shown that he himself faced a credible harm of contracting BSE. The dissenting Judge
found the absence of evidence of BSE in the United States to be particularly
significant, and wrote that although Baur may be correct in his allegations that the
USDA should act differently to prevent an outbreak of BSE in the country, he “cannot
properly use this Court as vehicle to advance the claims to proper policy.” Id. at 652.
178
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. Dep’t
of Agric., No. 05-35264, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17360, at *18 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2005).
179
9 C.F.R. § 309.2(b) (2010). For a discussion of the USDA’s regulatory
response to mad cow disease, and an argument that the agency has acted
incompetently and inefficiently, see Jason R. Odeshoo, No Brainer? The USDA’s
Regulatory Response to the Discovery of Mad Cow Disease in the United States, 16
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 277 (2005).
180
For a discussion of whether risk itself is a harm, see Claire Finkelstein, Is
Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963 (2003).
181
See Baur, 352 F.3d at 633 & n.7 (listing cases).
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food and drug safety suits . . . we conclude that such injuries
are cognizable for standing purposes, where the plaintiff
alleges exposure to potentially harmful products.”182
The Second Circuit cited cases from the Fourth Circuit,
the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the D.C. Circuit to
show the general acceptance of increased risk of harm as a
basis for Article III standing. All of the cited cases, except those
in the Seventh Circuit, were in the environmental context.183
And although it has recognized that increased risk can be a
basis for standing, the D.C. Circuit has taken a strict view of
whether increased risk of harm constitutes injury in fact. In
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency, the court vacated its earlier decision which had
dismissed NRDC’s petition for lack of standing.184 In this case,
NRDC sued the EPA, charging that the agency’s issuance of a
rule establishing exemptions from an international treaty that
mandated the reduction of the use of methyl bromide—a
substance that degrades the ozone layer—violated both the
treaty and the Clean Air Act.185 The court initially held that
NRDC’s claim that its members faced a greater chance of
contracting skin cancer and other illnesses under the EPA rule
was too hypothetical to constitute injury-in-fact.186 NRDC
moved for rehearing, and both NRDC and EPA, in its
opposition to the petition for rehearing, presented new
182

Id. at 634.
Id. at 633. Courts have occasionally recognized increased risk of harm as a
basis for Article III standing in contexts outside of environmental law. For example, in
Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit
permitted a plaintiff’s allegation of an increased risk of harm from the implantation of
a medical device that required current medical monitoring to constitute injury in fact.
The court accepted plaintiff’s analogy to cases where plaintiffs have been exposed to
toxins (i.e., nuclear emissions or asbestos) and have an increased risk of disease. Id. at
571. Courts in the Second Circuit have also permitted an allegation of increased risk of
harm to satisfy the injury in fact requirement when a plaintiff claims an “increased
future risk of identity theft,” see Caudle v. Towers, Perrin, Forster & Crosby, Inc., 580
F. Supp. 2d 273, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), an increased risk of being assessed penalties
because of reliance on fraudulent tax advice, see Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443
F.3d 253, 264-65 (2d Cir. 2006) (“An injury-in-fact may simply be the fear or anxiety of
future harm. For example, exposure to toxic or harmful substances has been held
sufficient to satisfy the Article III injury-in-fact requirement even without physical
symptoms of injury caused by the exposure, and even though exposure alone may not
provide sufficient grounds for a claim under state tort law.”), and an increased risk of
injury based on the defendant’s failure to secure plaintiff prisoner’s wheelchair
properly when he was being transported. Shariff v. Goord, 04-CV-6621 CJS(F), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49957, at *10, *20 (W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2006).
184
464 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacating 440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
185
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
186
Id. at 484.
183
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information regarding the risk to NRDC’s members from the
EPA’s rule.187 In response to this new information, the D.C.
Circuit found that NRDC did have standing.188 Based on the
EPA’s own expert estimate, the court calculated that two to
four of NRDC’s five hundred thousand members would develop
cancer as a result of the rule—a risk the court considered
sufficient to support standing.189
In NRDC, the court expressly did not decide whether it
was appropriate to take a quantitative approach to
determining whether an increased risk of injury constituted
injury in fact.190 The court repeated its refusal to decide whether
any increase in risk was enough for standing shortly thereafter
in Virginia State Corp. Commission v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, but cabined this open question to
environmental disputes, stating that “[o]utside the realm of
environmental disputes . . . we have suggested that a claim of
increased risk or probability cannot suffice.”191
The D.C. Circuit clarified its position on increased risk
in the non-environmental context a year later, in 2007, in
Public Citizen, Inc. v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration.192 In Public Citizen, petitioners—including a
citizens group, tire makers, and a tire industry association—
challenged a federal motor vehicle safety standard requiring
cars to contain tire pressure monitors that lit up when the tire
pressure fell below a set standard.193 The court asked for
supplemental briefing on whether the challenged standard
“creates a substantial increase in the risk of death, physical
injury, or property loss,” over the alternative interpretation,
and whether the risk of harm, including the alleged increase,
was substantial.194 The court noted that it had only allowed
standing in increased risk of harm cases when both of these
factors were present, noting that there were several reasons
187

Natural Res. Def. Council, 464 F.3d at 3.
Id. at 7.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 6-7. After deciding NRDC had standing, the court dismissed the case
on the merits. Id. at 11.
191
Va. State Corp. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 468 F.3d 845,
848 (D.C. Cir. 2006). In this case the court found that it “need not face those issues
here,” because petitioner, who had argued that its investors faced an increased risk of
incorrectly evaluating the company’s financial health, made no showing adequate to
explain their position. Id.
192
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
193
Id. at 1284.
194
Id. at 1297.
188
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why standing should not be allowed lightly in probabilistic
cases: (1) allowing injury based on speculative injury would
allow judicial review of any agency action because almost all
agency action slightly increases risk or, according to citizen
preference, insufficiently decreases risk; (2) speculative injury
standing would eliminate the requirement that an injury be
“actual or imminent” from the standing requirements; and (3)
such cases would cause the judiciary to infringe on the
Executive’s responsibility to “take care” that the laws were
faithfully executed by expanding its role beyond the hearing of
actual cases or controversies.195 Not surprisingly, the court
found that Public Citizen did not meet its burden in its
supplemental briefing and dismissed its claims.196
The United States Supreme Court appeared to accept
probabilistic harm, characterized as increased risk of injury, as
support for standing in the environmental context in
Massachusetts v. EPA.197 Although the Court noted that “rising
seas have already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal
land,” it emphasized that
[t]he severity of that injury will only increase over the course of the
next century: If sea levels continue to rise as predicted, one
Massachusetts official believes that a significant fraction of coastal
property will be “either permanently lost through inundation or
temporarily lost through periodic storm surge and flooding events.”
Remediation costs alone, petitioners allege, could run well into the
hundreds of millions of dollars.198

195

Id. at 1295.
Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 513 F.3d 234,
235-36 (D.C. Cir. 2008). See Amanda Leiter, Substance or Illusion? The Dangers of
Imposing a Standing Threshold, 97 GEO. L.J. 391 (2009) (arguing that the D.C.
Circuit’s imposition of a substantiality-of-risk threshold is unsupported by any
theoretical foundation, and is the wrong approach to determining which increased-risk
cases should be justiciable).
197
See Robin Kundis Craig, Removing “The Cloak of a Standing Inquiry”:
Pollution Regulation, Public Health, and Private Risk in the Injury-in-Fact Analysis, 29
CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 194-96 (2007) (discussing the majority’s acceptance of
probabilistic harm as a basis for standing); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the
Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494 (2008) (arguing for “precautionarybased standing,” in which the precautionary principle is applied to the standing
analysis and in cases where there is uncertainty about whether irreversible and
catastrophic events will occur). But c.f. Leiter, supra note 196, at 402 (arguing that
Massachusetts v. EPA does not sanction the use of probabilistic harm as a basis for
standing, especially not for individual (versus sovereign) plaintiffs).
198
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (citation omitted).
196
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The Court’s characterization of Massachusetts’ standing relies
heavily, if not exclusively, on these allegations of future injury.199
Increased risk of harm as a basis for standing is a
critical tool for food-safety-impact litigants, and whether their
claims are successful may depend on whether the courts they
are before permit increased risk of harm claims in cases
outside of environmental disputes, and whether the court views
food-safety issues as either a subset of or analogous to
environmental disputes. The possibility of reaching the merits
of the case in such litigation will also depend on whether the
court applies a quantitative assessment to increased risk, or
assumes that any increased risk is adequate.200
2. The Necessity of Third-Party Action May Thwart
Redressability
In Levine v. Vilsack, another food-safety-impact case,
the court found that standing failed on redressability grounds
rather than injury-in-fact grounds. Here, the district court
accepted plaintiffs’ allegations of increased injury of harm as a
basis for Article III standing, but the Court of Appeals found
that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge a USDA
Notice because even if the plaintiffs prevailed in court, the
requested relief was only available through a series of
speculative steps and the actions of third-parties.201 For this
reason, plaintiffs failed to satisfy the redressability prong of
the standing inquiry.
In 2005, several individual plaintiffs and several
associational plaintiffs (the “Levine Plaintiffs”) brought suit in
federal district court, challenging a USDA Notice (“Notice”)
issued earlier that year, which stated that the slaughter of
poultry is not governed by any federal standard. The Levine
Plaintiffs alleged that the Notice was contrary to law,
specifically to the APA, and to the Humane Methods of
Slaughter Act (HMSA), a 1958 statute that provided that
“cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock”
199

In this regard, see Justice Roberts’ dissent: “[A]ccepting a century-long
time horizon and a series of compounded estimates renders requirements of imminence
and immediacy utterly toothless. . . . ‘Allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy
the requirements of Art. III. A threatened injury must be certainly impending to
constitute injury in fact.’” Id. at 542 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
200
Once again, as mentioned supra in note 176, it also remains to be seen how
courts negotiate the plausibility standard of Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
201
Levine v. Johanns, 587 F.3d 986, 993-95 (9th Cir. 2009).
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must be humanely slaughtered.202 In 1978, parts of the HMSA
were incorporated into the Federal Meat Inspection Act
(FMIA), which had the effect of prohibiting federal inspection
of meat that had not been slaughtered in compliance with the
humane slaughter methods dictated by the HMSA.203 Meat that
is not federally inspected cannot enter the marketplace. The
1978 version of the HMSA retained the section of the 1958
HMSA that listed the types of animals that must be humanely
slaughtered, which included “other livestock.”204 The Levine
Plaintiffs argued that because the 1958 HMSA was still in
force, the Notice—which said that no federal standard applied
to poultry—was construing “other livestock” to exclude poultry,
which was an arbitrary and capricious interpretation. Because
of the Notice, argued the Levine plaintiffs, poultry was being
slaughtered inhumanely.205
The associational plaintiffs were nonprofit organizations
that worked to prevent cruelty to animals, and they brought
suit challenging the Notice on behalf of their members, who
were also listed as individual plaintiffs, and who were
characterized as “regular consumers of poultry meat.” The
Levine Plaintiffs alleged that inhumane methods of slaughter
increased the possibility that the poultry would be
contaminated by bacteria, thereby increasing their risk of
illness each time they ate inhumanely slaughtered poultry.206
202

7 U.S.C. § 1902(a) (2006).
21 U.S.C. § 610(b) (2006).
204
Levine v. Johanns, No. C 05-04764 MHP, No. C 05-05346 MHP, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2006). Confusingly, however, the 1978
HMSA, while not repealing the section of the 1958 HMSA applying humane slaughter
standards to “other livestock,” also stated that humane slaughter standards only applied
to “cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, mules, and other equines.” 21 U.S.C. § 610(b).
205
Levine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *4-5.
206
Id. at *5. These plaintiffs were joined by several workers in poultry
processing plants and two organizations that represented workers. They alleged
physical and emotional injuries from working in plants where poultry is slaughtered
inhumanely. Id. at *6-7.
After this case was filed, the court related it with another case challenging
the USDA’s failure to apply humane slaughter requirements to bison and reindeer.
Plaintiffs in this case alleged that they regularly ate bison and reindeer meat, and were
therefore at increased risk of contracting food poisoning whenever they ate meat that
had been inhumanely slaughtered. Id. at *9. The court dismissed the Bison plaintiffs’
complaint with prejudice, concluding that the USDA did not have a non-discretionary
duty to apply the humane slaughter requirements to bison and reindeer, and the APA
challenge therefore failed. Id. at *46-50. Section 706(1) of the APA provides for a court
to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1) (2006), and to bring an action under this section, a plaintiff must show that
“an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take.” Levine,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *46 (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,
542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)).
203
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The district court found that the individual plaintiffs
established the requirements of Article III standing: injury-infact, traceability, and redressability.207 The allegation that
certain individual plaintiffs were at an increased risk for
illness was neither too generalized, nor too speculative to
constitute injury-in-fact.208 As long as a harm “is separate from
an interest in having the government abide by the law,” it “may
be concrete even though it is widely shared,” explained the
court.209 Moreover, the court found there to be a “credible”
threat that the plaintiffs would suffer concrete harm in the
future, which it found sufficient to satisfy the imminence prong
of the injury-in-fact inquiry.210 Analogizing to Baur, the court
found the plaintiffs’ claims credible because they relied on the
USDA’s own studies showing that bacterial contamination was
more likely when inhumane slaughtering methods were used.211
The court dismissed the claims of the Levine
associational plaintiffs with leave to amend because they had
failed to satisfy the requirements for associational standing.
For an organization to have standing to sue on behalf of its
members, it must show that: (1) “its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right,” (2) “the interests at
stake are germane to the organization’s purpose,” and (3)
“neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires
the participation of individual members’ in the lawsuit.”212 The
organizations in the lawsuit had asserted the interest of
protecting their members’ health, although the actual main
purpose of the organization was to prevent animal cruelty.213
207

Although the court dismissed the Bison plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of
jurisdiction under the APA, it held that all of the plaintiffs, including the animals, had
Article III standing, but that the animals lacked statutory standing as the APA only
applied to “person[s].” Levine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *45.
208
Id. at *14-31. John Does I and II were found to have Article III standing
based on their allegations of physical and emotional injuries. Id. at *32.
209
Id. at *15 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1998)).
210
Id. at *29.
211
Id. at *20-21.
212
See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
213
One of the organizational plaintiffs was permitted to continue because it
stated that it was dedicated partly to consumer protection and human health. Levine,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *37-39. The court also found the challenged Notice to
constitute a final agency action which was subject to judicial review. The Levine
plaintiffs challenged the Notice under APA section 706(2), which provides that a court
can “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions” that are
“arbitrary” or “capricious.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006). To be set aside under this
section, an agency action must be discrete and final, and to be final, an action must “(1)
‘mark the consummation of the agency’s decision making process’ and not be tentative,
and (2) have legal consequences.’” Levine, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *52 (citing
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Subsequently, the district court granted summary judgment to
defendants, ruling that “Congress intended to exclude poultry
from the categorical word ‘livestock.’”214 Plaintiffs appealed, and
the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision,
remanding the case for the district court to dismiss based on
the plaintiffs’ lack of Article III standing. The Ninth Circuit did
not question the district court’s injury-in-fact analysis,215 but
found instead that none of the plaintiffs could show that their
alleged injury could be redressed by any ruling of the court.
Because the HMSA had no enforcement mechanism, any
decision of the court would have to be followed by a series of
steps to reach the plaintiffs’ desired result of the use of more
humane poultry slaughter methods, all of which steps were
speculative. If the court ruled that the Notice was contrary to
law and poultry should be included as “other livestock,” the
Secretary would have to determine that poultry should fall
under the FMIA’s umbrella, and then issue regulations for the
humane slaughter of poultry. Furthermore, private processors
would then have to follow these regulations. Because of the
speculative nature of each of these steps, the court found the
likelihood of relief to be too low to satisfy the redressability
prong of Article III.216
Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997)). The court determined that the Notice
constituted final agency action. Id. at *61.
The court also ordered that the Levine plaintiffs show cause as to why the
claims of the workers, EJC, and WNCWC should not be dismissed for improper venue.
Id. at *65.
214
Levine v. Conner, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2008). It appears
that the Levine individual plaintiffs—characterized by the court as “poultry eaters
concerned about food-borne illness”—and the organizations representing the workers
were the only plaintiffs left. Id. at 1113.
215
The absence of a discussion regarding injury-in-fact most likely shows that
the Ninth Circuit accepts that a “credible” increase in risk suffices as injury-in-fact. In
this regard, see also Central Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947
(9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he possibility of future injury may be sufficient to confer standing
on plaintiffs; threatened injury constitutes ‘injury in fact.’”).
216
Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 988, 993-95, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). The
redressability point was not as clear cut as the Ninth Circuit represented. The court
concluded that the chain of events that would have to take place to remedy plaintiffs’
injury (the increased risk of foodborne illness) was too speculative to satisfy the Article III
standing requirements, supposing that if the court construed “other livestock” to include
poultry, the Secretary of Agriculture would still need to enforce the humane slaughter
mechanisms in the FMIA and write regulations to do so. The court also noted that poultry
processors would then have to adhere to the regulations. However, if one instead assumes
that the Secretary will follow the legislative mechanism, then an inclusion of poultry in
the HMSA humane slaughter mandate would lead inevitably to poultry’s inclusion in the
FMIA, and the writing of regulations to govern its humane slaughter. Moreover, the
inclusion of poultry in the definition of “other livestock” would surely relieve the injury to
plaintiffs, which was the failure to include poultry in this definition, even if its ultimate
effectiveness in ensuring humane slaughter requirements was delayed. See, e.g.,
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In Levine, the associational plaintiffs failed to satisfy
the requirements for associational standing because the
interest that they asserted was not germane to the
organization’s purpose. However, had they asserted an interest
in animal welfare, they may have failed to satisfy the
prudential zone-of-interests standing test, as did the plaintiffs
in the next case.
3. The Zone-of-Interests Standing Requirement
The zone-of-interests standing requirement appears to
be a sticking point for the existing food-safety impact cases.
This is only, however, because a significant portion of these
cases thus far have been instigated by organizations such as
animal welfare organizations or trade associations which have
as their main purpose something other than food safety or
consumer protection. The interests germane to these
organizations’ purposes are not protected by the food-safety
statutes. In Baur, Farm Sanctuary, with whom Michael Baur
originally brought suit, was dismissed from the case because as
an animal welfare organization, it could not assert an interest
protected by the Federal Meat Inspection Act or the Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.217 The Levine associational
plaintiffs were dismissed because the interest they asserted in
the lawsuit, the protection of their members’ health—which
presumably they asserted because it fell under the zone of
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 (2007) (“‘[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability
requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to
himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury’” (quoting
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, n.15 (1982))).
The Ninth Circuit also commented that a district court need not take a
plaintiff at her word at the motion-to-dismiss stage when determining the
redressability prong of Article III standing—that this standard only applies to injury in
fact and causation. Levine, 587 F.3d at 997 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
The court, however, did not discuss whether the standard for taking a
plaintiff at her word at the motion-to-dismiss stage had changed since Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). It
appears that the Ninth Circuit is now applying the Iqbal standard to 12(b)(1) subject
matter jurisdiction challenges. See Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency
Mgmt. Agency, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1158 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
Here, the Ninth Circuit explained that a plaintiff needed to plead facts
showing the likelihood of redressability by pointing to earlier (1990, 1975) Supreme
Court decisions, and without addressing Iqbal or Twombly, thereby implying that this
had long been the case. By not discussing the district court’s injury-in-fact
determination, the Ninth Circuit was therefore able to avoid discussing the possible
effect Iqbal and Twombly would have on such an analysis.
217
Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Veneman, 212 F. Supp. 2d 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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interests of the Federal Meat Inspection Act—was not germane
to the purposes of their organization.218
And, in 2005, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a claim by the
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of
America (R-CALF), a nonprofit organization representing United
States cattle producers “on domestic and international trade and
marketing issues [which] . . . is dedicated to ensuring the
continued profitability and viability of the U.S. cattle industry”219
under NEPA for a failure to satisfy the zone-of-interests
prudential standing requirement. R-CALF had sued the USDA
seeking to overturn the USDA’s decision to lift a ban on Canadian
imports of most bovine meat for human consumption.220
Until January 4, 2005, the USDA had banned the
importation of all ruminants and ruminant products from
countries in which BSE had been found, including Canada.221
On that date, the USDA published a Final Rule relaxing the
ban on the importation of Canadian ruminants. R-CALF sued
to block the implementation of the Rule, arguing that it was
arbitrary and capricious under the APA; that it violated NEPA
because the agency had failed to make its environmental
assessment public before publishing the Rule and had failed to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement; and that it
violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) by failing to
assess whether the Rule’s impact on small businesses could
have been mitigated.222
The district court agreed with plaintiffs on all counts,
writing that the USDA had “preconceived intention, based
upon inappropriate considerations, to rush to reopen the border
regardless of uncertainties in the agency’s knowledge,” and had
“attempted to work backwards to support and justify this

218

Levine v. Johanns, No. C 05-04764 MHP, No. C 05-05346 MHP, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *38-39 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2006).
219
About R-Calf USA; Working for the U.S. Cattle Industry, R-CALF USA,
http://www.r-calfusa.com/about/about.htm (last updated Feb. 11, 2011).
220
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v.
Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005).
221
As the Ninth Circuit explained, “[r]uminants are hoofed mammals
generally defined by their four-chambered stomachs and their practice of chewing a cud
consisting of regurgitated, partially digested food,” and “include cattle, sheep, goats,
deer, giraffes, camels, llamas, and okapi.” Id. at 1084 n.1.
222
The RFA dates from 1980, and was passed “to ‘encourage administrative
agencies to consider the potential impact of nascent federal regulations on small
businesses.’” Id. at 1100 (quoting Assoc. Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104,
111 (1st Cir. 1997)).
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goal,”223 but the Ninth Circuit reversed. First, the court found
that the district court had improperly substituted its judgment
for that of the agency and had failed to defer properly to the
agency’s determinations. The court found the USDA’s
determination that the risks inherent in the Rule were both
small and acceptable to be supported by an adequate
administrative record.224 As to the RFA, the Ninth Circuit held
that the USDA met RFA’s purely procedural requirements, by
“conduct[ing] a detailed economic assessment of its proposed
rule on small businesses.”225
Regarding NEPA, the Ninth Circuit held that R-CALF
did not have standing to pursue its claim under this statute.226
NEPA, which prescribes the steps an agency must take before
taking an action that will affect the environment, contains no
private right of action or citizen-suit provision. A plaintiff suing
for a NEPA violation must bring suit under the APA and must
fall under the zone of interests protected by NEPA. Under
Ninth Circuit law, a party seeking to sue for a NEPA violation
must assert an environmental injury.227 R-CALF, however,
exists to protect the economic interests of its members, and the
injuries it asserted in its complaint were economic.228 Economic
interests are not protected by NEPA, and R-CALF therefore
lacked standing to bring its NEPA challenge. The Ninth Circuit
remanded the case, and the district court granted summary
judgment to the USDA.229
4. Conclusion
These cases, both in the abstract and as tools for future
food-safety-impact litigation, teach three lessons. First, the
223

Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v.
Dep’t of Agric., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066, 1074 (D. Mont. 2005).
224
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am., 415
F.3d at 1100.
225
Id. at 1101.
226
Id. at 1103-04.
227
Id. at 1103 (citing Stratford v. FAA, 285 F.3d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
228
R-CALF also asserted that “R-CALF USA members will also be adversely
affected by the increased risk of disease they face when Canadian beef enters the U.S.
meat supply.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
229
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v.
Dep’t of Agric., 359 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (D. Mont. 2005). The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, reminding R-CALF that it could not use post-decision evidence to show that
the USDA had “rel[ied] on faulty assumptions,” but that it could use this new evidence
to petition the USDA to reopen rulemaking under the APA. Ranchers Cattlemen Action
Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v. Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1108, 1111, 111718 (9th Cir. 2007).
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standing challenges are navigable. At least the Ninth Circuit
and the Second Circuit have shown themselves amenable to the
allegation of an increased risk of contracting foodborne illness
as a basis for injury in fact. Such a claim matches the purpose
of the statutes that protect the safety of our food supply.
Second, these cases illustrate the absence of a foodsafety-impact litigation culture. Two of these three cases were
brought by animal welfare organizations, and one by a trade
organization. Not one of the organizations spearheading this
litigation had as its primary purpose the prevention, or
minimization of foodborne illness, although they all alleged the
increased risk of such as a basis for standing. Food-safety
litigants, especially organizational litigants, must better
negotiate the zone-of-interests test.
And finally, in two of the three cases, the court found the
plaintiffs’ use of the government’s own studies to show that the
agency action would result in the alleged harm to be strong
support for standing. The agency’s refusal to act in the face of its
own studies lends support to the possibility that the agency’s
final action was arbitrary and capricious, and allows a court to
remain deferential to the agency, while ruling against it.
C.

Challenges to Judicial Review of Agency Action

As described above, food-safety-impact litigation must
be brought under the APA because the major food-safety
statutes have neither citizen-suit provisions nor provide for
private rights of action. Each case discussed above in the
section on standing involved a challenge to agency action under
the APA, for these very reasons, and in two, defendants
challenged whether the agency action was reviewable under
the APA. In Levine, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs
had not challenged a final agency action, as is necessary for
review under the APA, but the court disagreed.230 And in the RCALF case, the Ninth Circuit ultimately determined that the
district court had erred under the APA in its failure to defer to
the agency’s expertise, and that the agency action was not,
therefore, arbitrary and capricious.231
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Levine v. Johanns, No. C 05-04764 MHP, No. C 05-05346 MHP, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *10, *58-61 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2006).
231
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am., 415
F.3d at 1100.
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Another
common232
challenge
to
the
judicial
reviewability of agency action in the food-safety context is the
claim that the agency action at issue has been committed to
agency discretion by law, and is therefore unreviewable under
section 701(a)(2) of the APA.233 There are several categories of
actions that the Supreme Court have found to fall under
section 701(a)(2), and thus to be unreviewable, including “an
agency’s decision not to institute enforcement proceedings,” “an
agency’s refusal to grant reconsideration of an action because of
material error,” and “the allocation of funds from a lump-sum
appropriation.”234 In the following two cases, defendants claimed
that the challenged agency action was an enforcement decision,
and therefore unreviewable under the APA. In each of these
cases, the court disagreed. Furthermore, both of these cases
were actually successful in achieving their requested relief.
Public Citizen v. Heckler was the impetus behind the
federal government’s ban on the interstate sale of raw milk.235
Public Citizen, a citizen advocacy organization, filed a citizen
petition with the FDA in April of 1984, requesting that the
agency prohibit the sale of unpasteurized milk.236 After no
ruling was made, and the FDA refused to provide a schedule
for a ruling, Public Citizen filed suit in September 1984 seeking
a response to its petition. HHS held an informal hearing in
October 1984 to solicit information on whether raw milk was a
232

“Common” insofar as this challenge was made in two of the fourteen cases found.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006).
234
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191-92 (1993) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 831 (1985); ICC v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 (1987)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
235
Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 653 F. Supp. 1229 (D.D.C. 1987). Raw milk is milk
that has not been pasteurized or homogenized. Before 1987, the federal government did
not regulate the sale of raw milk, although many local and state governments did in
some manner. The city of Chicago passed a mandatory milk pasteurization law in 1908,
and in 1947, Michigan was the first state to do so.
236
Id. at 1231-33. In 1973, the Food and Drug Administration had
promulgated a regulation prohibiting the sale of all unpasteurized milk products in
interstate commerce, but, in 1974, this was stayed as to certified raw milk until the
FDA could hold a hearing as to its safety. In re Revising Existing Standards and
Establishing New Identity Standards for Milk and Cream, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,924 (Oct. 10,
1973) (stayed in 39 Fed. Reg. 42,351 (Dec. 5, 1984)). “[C]ertified raw milk” satisfies
standards established by the American Association of Medical Milk Commissions. Pub.
Citizen, 653 F. Supp. at 1232.
The FDA collected information from 1974 to 1982, and in 1982, wrote a
proposed regulation banning the interstate sale of all raw milk, based on the evidence
that the consumption of raw milk was linked to bacterial disease. High-level officials at
HHS and the CDC supported this regulation, and statistical support was provided by
the Chief of the Bureau of Foods Epidemiology and Clinical Toxicology Division in
1984. Id. at 1232-33.
233
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public health concern and, if so, whether requiring
pasteurization was the best solution. The evidence collected by
the FDA, and the evidence introduced at the informal hearing
“conclusively show[ed] . . . [that] raw milk is unsafe.”237
After the district court ruled that the Department of
Health and Human Services’ “justifications for delay were
‘lame at best and irresponsible at worst,’” and ordered the
Department to respond,238 the Department responded by
denying Public Citizen’s petition for several reasons, including
the following: (1) most raw milk was sold intrastate, (2)
illnesses from raw milk stemmed mainly from intrastate
commerce, and (3) banning interstate sales of raw milk would
therefore have little effect on the public health.239 Public Citizen
returned to district court to challenge the rule as arbitrary and
capricious.240
Defendant HHS challenged the reviewability of the
petition’s denial, claiming that it was an enforcement decision,
and thus fell under the section 701(a)(2) exception to
reviewability. The court rejected this contention, explaining
that “[h]ere the action at issue is not an individual enforcement
action, but an agency’s refusal to engage in rulemaking.”241
Furthermore, in Heckler v. Chaney, the case establishing the
discretionary enforcement exception, the agency chose not to
take an enforcement action against an entity, and there were
no clear statutory guidelines for the court to interpret on when
such actions should be taken. Here, on the other hand, HHS’s
action could be reviewed with the clear statutory guidelines of
the FFDCA and the Public Health Act as a guide.242
The court then determined that the denial of Public
Citizen’s petition was arbitrary and capricious. It found the
explanation offered to be inconsistent with the evidence in
front of the agency; that the documents before the court showed
237

Pub. Citizen, 653 F. Supp. at 1241.
Id. at 1234-35 (citing Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611, 613
(D.D.C. 1985)).
239
Id. at 1235. The FDA’s other reasons were that milk sold interstate did not
pose a greater risk than milk sold intrastate, that the FDA did not have the authority
to prohibit intrastate sales, and that the problem was better dealt with by state and
local governments anyway. Id.
240
Id. at 1231.
241
Id. at 1236 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 825 n.2 (1985)). This
issue was settled in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“Refusals to
promulgate rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such review is
‘extremely limited’ and ‘highly deferential’” (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers &
Forwarders Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).
242
Public Citizen, 602 F. Supp. at 1236.
238
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that high level officials at the FDA and the CDC thought a ban
on raw milk sales was a good idea, and indicated “a lack of
rationality on the part of HHS in the decisionmaking process”;
and that the reason given for the decision had “no rational
connection to the undisputed facts in the record.”243 Pursuant to
the court’s order, the FDA published a Final Rule banning the
interstate sale of all raw milk and all raw milk products.244
In Kenney v. Glickman, a number of individual
plaintiffs,245 calling themselves “poultry consumers,” sued the
USDA for discrepancies in the way that the USDA regulated
poultry and meat.246 Plaintiffs argued that the USDA should
either issue the same regulations for poultry and meat, or
provide a “legally sufficient reason for treating meat and
poultry differently.”247
The Eighth Circuit rejected the USDA’s contention that
the discrepancies between the meat and poultry inspection
standards reflected an enforcement decision—that the agency
had merely chosen to use agency resources to enforce meat
inspections more rigorously. The standards at issue involved
neither a decision about whether there had been a violation nor
a refusal to institute proceeding, but were, instead, general

243

Id. at 1237, 1241.
21 C.F.R. § 1240.61 (2010); Memoranda from Milk Safety Branch on
Sale/Consumption of Raw Milk to All Regional Food and Drug Directors (Mar. 19, 2003),
available at http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-SpecificInformation/MilkSafety/
CodedMemoranda/MemorandaofInformation/ucm079103.htm.
245
Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1118 (8th Cir. 1996). The original plaintiffs
included red meat producers, who brought the case to remedy a perceived inequity in the
USDA’s treatment of poultry and of beef, but the district court dismissed these plaintiffs for
lack of standing. See Joe Roybal, Fighting for Fairness, BEEF MAG. (Nov. 1, 2000, 1:00 PM),
http://beefmagazine.com/mag/beef_fighting_fairness/. The red meat producers did not
appeal. See id.
246
Both the PPIA, which regulates poultry products, and the FMIA, which
regulates meat, require that carcasses be inspected for the presence of certain
contaminants that may cause the carcasses to be termed “adulterated,” and hence not
allowed into the food supply. Kenney, 96 F.3d at 1121. Individual carcasses are
inspected, and any contaminants are removed. Id. No contaminants are allowed to
remain; there is a “zero tolerance” policy as to these contaminants on individual
carcasses. Id. The contaminated parts must be removed from meat, while they may be
washed off of poultry. Id. After the individual carcasses are inspected, an inspector
then inspects sample carcasses from a particular lot to determine if there may be any
process defects on that lot. Id. Until 1993, both the PPIA and the FMIA allowed a
tolerance level of slightly more than zero for process defects, but in March 1993, the
USDA lowered the tolerance level to zero for meat, but not for poultry. Id.
247
Id.
244
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policies.248 The case did not, therefore, fall into the Heckler v.
Chaney category of presumptively unreviewable cases.249
The Court of Appeals also found that the prohibition
against allowing adulterated products to enter the food supply
provided a “sufficient standard” for the court to evaluate
whether the USDA’s policies made sense.250 In addition, the
court looked to the legislative history of the PPIA and the
FMIA to determine that Congress intended for the two to be
construed consistently. For this reason, there was sufficient
law to apply to determine whether the USDA acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in implementing differing inspection
standards for meat and poultry.251
After remand, the district court found the discrepancy
between meat and poultry regulation to be arbitrary and
capricious,252 and in direct response to this decision—indeed,
noting the decision in the background to the Final Rule—the
FSIS harmonized the regulations.253
Kenney and Public Citizen have three main implications.
First, Heckler v. Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability does
not apply to arbitrary and capricious challenges to the refusal to
promulgate rules, which, in any event, was settled definitively
by Massachusetts v. EPA.254 Second, if a petitioner presents
evidence to support its allegations, the statutes governing food
safety (including the FMIA, the PPIA, and the FFDCA) provide
sufficient guidelines for a court to determine whether the
relevant agency has acted reasonably. Third, a court is more
likely to permit a case to go forward if petitioner’s evidence was
produced by the relevant agency.255

248

Id. at 1123.
Id. One judge dissented in part, finding that the USDA’s regulations
regarding tolerance standards for process defects and regarding the methods used to
cleanse contaminants were enforcement actions, and were therefore presumptively
unreviewable under Chaney. Id. at 1126 (McMillian, J., dissenting in part).
250
Id. at 1124 (majority opinion).
251
Id.
252
Roybal, supra note 245. The district court decision is unavailable.
253
See Retained Water in Raw Meat and Poultry Products; Poultry Chilling
Requirements, 66 Fed. Reg. 1750, 1751-52 (Jan. 9, 2001), available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FRPubs/97-054F.html.
254
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“Refusals to promulgate
rules are thus susceptible to judicial review, though such review is ‘extremely limited’
and ‘highly deferential’” (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am.,
Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989))).
255
This has been a theme throughout the food-safety cases. The court relied
on the government’s own documents to find standing in Baur, and in Levine as well,
although that decision was overturned on other grounds.
249
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Paths to Success in Food-Safety-Impact Litigation

The upshot of the food-safety cases described above is
that suits brought by food consumers or public health
organizations alleging an increased risk of contracting
foodborne illness because of an established governmental
policy, and relying on the agency’s own documents, are likely to
get into court. Specifically, these cases have four main
implications for justiciability.
First, courts seem to generally accept that the increase in
risk of foodborne illness satisfies the Article III injury in fact
standing requirement. This is noted with several caveats. One is
that not every court is likely to accept such a claim. As discussed
above, the D.C. Circuit would most likely look for a quantifiable
increase in risk, and may even prohibit this category of claimant
from litigating outside of the environmental context. The second
caveat is that the cases discussed above were, for the most part,
decided before the Court’s decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,256 which instructed district courts that
a plaintiff needed factual allegations that “raise a right to relief
above the speculative level,” and must “state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.”257 Lower courts are now grappling with
the implications of applying this “plausibility standard” to
determinations regarding challenges to subject matter
jurisdiction, including standing challenges.258 This standard may
make it more difficult for impact plaintiffs to progress beyond the
motion-to-dismiss stage, although many will have been through
the administrative petitioning process before filing a complaint,
thus allowing them to gather information and evidence towards
their complaint. Those plaintiffs who can accumulate more
information before filing a complaint will fare better.
The second lesson learned from the above discussion of
justiciability relates to a plaintiff’s use of the relevant agency’s
own documents and evidence to show that the potential harm
from the agency action was significant. The Levine, Baur,
Kenney, and Public Citizen courts found the fact that the
agency’s own documents supported plaintiffs’ contentions (i.e.,
inhumanly slaughtered poultry are more likely to be carriers of
256

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007).
257
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
258
See, e.g., Coal. for a Sustainable Delta v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency,
711 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Eugster v. Wash. State Bar Ass’n, No. CV 09357-SMM, 2010 WL 2926237 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2010).
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communicable illness; downed cattle are more likely to have
mad cow disease; the PPIA and the FMIA were meant to be
construed similarly; FDA officials themselves acknowledged
the danger of drinking raw milk) to be a compelling factor in
allowing the case into court, and in the case of Public Citizen,
to rule in favor of the plaintiff.
Is this not a question for the merits? Yes, such
documents ultimately go to whether the plaintiff has managed
to show that the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious.
But the presence of such documents indicates to the court that
the suit is neither futile nor frivolous; it speaks to an implicit
likelihood of success inquiry. A court is required to defer to an
agency’s reasonable construction of its regulations,259 and may
not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. This is even
more important when a high level of technical expertise is
implicated.260 Because judicial deference to agency decision
making is so strong, a court must see a role for itself in the
dispute, and a way to remain within its institutional
competence before it allows plaintiffs into court. Documentary
evidence of the relevant harm indicates that, whether through
corruption, inefficiency, or sheer irrationality, the agency has
acted against its own evidence and, in certain cases, its own
directives. Moreover, such documents show that the agency
was not acting pursuant to internal management
considerations or other factors that a court should have no
hand in administering.261
The use of an agency’s own documents by petitioners
does not, however, guarantee success on the merits. For
example, in the R-CALF case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction to plaintiffs,
259

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am. v.
Dep’t of Agric., No. 05-35264, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17360, at *32 (9th Cir. Aug. 17,
2005). Similarly, in Simpson v. Young, 854 F.2d 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the D.C. Circuit
dismissed a citizen-suit challenge to the FDA’s decision to list a color additive, Blue No. 2
dye, as safe for human consumption. Public Citizen, the Center for Science in the Public
Interest, and a private citizen alleged that the FDA’s studies on the dye had been
improperly done. The court explained that it was compelled to “uphold the FDA’s decision
if it reveals that significant evidence on both sides of the question has been considered
and that the agency has explained its conclusions in light of significant objections.” Id. at
1434. Deference to the agency’s judgment was particularly important in cases involving
“sophisticated scientific judgment,” as was this one. Id. And in Public Citizen v. Foreman,
631 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1980), discussed supra note 162, the D.C. Circuit dismissed
Public Citizen’s challenge to the FDA’s determination that nitrites were sanctioned as a
preservative prior to 1958, and therefore qualified for an exemption from the FFDCA,
finding that it must defer to the agency’s technical expertise.
261
Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1996).
260
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explaining that the district court had failed to sufficiently defer
to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.262 The appeals
court noted that the district court had erred by “analyzing each
protective component of the regulatory system in isolation,”
instead of “evaluat[ing] the cumulative effects of the multiple,
interlocking safeguards.”263
Third, an organizational plaintiff must be able to show
that the interests at stake in the lawsuit are germane to the
organization’s purpose and that the interests asserted fall under
the zone of interests protected by the statute. This was an issue
with the animal welfare organizations in Levine, which could not
show that that an interest in consumer health, as put forward in
this lawsuit, was germane to their purposes;264 with R-CALF,
which could not show environmental injury so as to have
standing under NEPA;265 in Baur, when Farm Sanctuary was
dismissed from the case;266 and in Kenney, where the red-meat
producers did not survive a motion to dismiss.267
This barrier is less likely to stand in the way of
environmental plaintiffs. In the first place, the citizen-suit
provisions arguably negate the zone-of-interests test altogether.268
Moreover, as discussed earlier, there is a well-organized
environmental impact plaintiff movement. Nothing similar exists
in the food-safety world. The inclusion of citizen-suit provisions in
the environmental laws was partially a function of the existence
of the environmental protection movement. Legislators, with the
help of individuals from these organizations, recognized a
beneficial symbiosis between the fledgling EPA and the efforts of
these organizations to enforce and strengthen regulation. In a
sense, several of these organizations, through a push and pull,
became extra eyes, ears, and arms of the government in enforcing
environmental protection.269
Because there are fewer litigating public health
organizations, food-safety litigation may be brought ostensibly
for public health, but actually for other purposes, such as the
262

Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am., 2005
U.S. App. LEXIS 17360, at *32.
263
Id. at *37.
264
Levine v. Johanns, No. C 05-04764 MHP, No. C 05-05346 MHP, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63667, at *37-39 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2006).
265
Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund United Stockgrowers of Am., 415
F.3d at 1100.
266
Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Veneman, 221 F. Supp. 2d 280, 284-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
267
See Roybal, supra note 245.
268
See supra note 176.
269
ADAMS & ET AL., supra note 77, at 27; SALE, supra note 96, at 34-35.
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humane treatment of animals, or the economic interests of
cattle producers—hence the associational standing and zone-ofinterests problem commonly faced by food-safety-impact
litigants. Of course, if an organization brings suit alongside a
consumer or two, the consumer may have standing even if the
organizational plaintiff does not. The suit can therefore go
forward, and the stated goal of the organization in the suit may
still be reached. Other goals, however, such as publicity for the
issue, and for the organization, may not be forthcoming in such
a suit. And in certain cases, increased public awareness is more
important than achievement of the suit’s sought relief.
Moreover, it is publicity that raises the profile of the
organization bringing the suit, lends legitimacy to its
enterprise, and teaches the public that this is an issue worthy
of donating money.
Fourth, and finally, courts are more likely to grant
access if the stated injury stems from a present governmental
policy—for example, the policy of allowing “downed” cattle to
enter the food supply.270 This element speaks to the injury-infact prong of the Article III standing analysis as well as the
redressability prong—no third party has to act for the injury to
take place, nor would a third party need to act for the
requested relief to take place.271
CONCLUSION
Food-safety-impact cases are few and far between, but
there is no compelling reason for this to remain the case. The
absence of citizen-suit provisions in the food-safety statutes
does not foreclose citizen suits. Food-safety-impact litigation
brought by individuals or groups able to show that they or their
members are at increased risk of contracting foodborne illness
as a result of a final agency action, ideally by pointing to
evidence in the relevant agency’s own documents, is likely to
make it past constitutional and prudential standing challenges.
Moreover, it is entirely within the competence of the judiciary
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Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 637 (2d Cir. 2003).
The Baur Court distinguished the harm alleged by plaintiff—increased risk
of foodborne illness—from “alleged future injury [that] rested on the independent actions
of third-parties not before the court.” Id. at 640. And the appeals court in Levine found
the need for actions by third parties—the poultry producers—to make the possibility of
redress for the plaintiffs too attenuated and consequently too speculative to satisfy the
Article III requirement. Levine v. Vilsack, 587 F.3d 986, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2009).
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to assess whether there has been arbitrary and capricious
action taken in the food-safety context.
Overseeing food safety in this country is an enormous job,
and agency oversight of food safety is, and will likely continue to
be, severely underfunded. There are numerous food-safety areas
where agency decision making has stalled, either from a lack of
resources or from industry pressure. Such inertia is detrimental
to the public health. Citizen litigation can act as a counterpart to
governmental regulation, pushing agencies to fulfill their
statutory mandates, and making judicial review of agency
decision making regarding food-safety regulation a valuable tool
in reducing the incidence of foodborne illness.

